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ABSTRACT

Physicians across the United States are burdened with the pressure of accurate coding
while trying to maintain quality patient care. Despite the economic importance of coding
accuracy, investigators have not reached consensus on the factors that contribute to coding
errors. This study fills this gap by investigating physician characteristics that explain the
variation in physician coding accuracy, specifically evaluation and management upcoding and
downcoding errors. An electronic survey was distributed to 325 physicians that measured
physicians’ attitudes towards risk and coding self-efficacy. Regression analysis found physicians
with low self-efficacy had more conservative coding behaviors, resulting in higher incidences of
downcoding. Physicians with high risk-seeking attitudes coded more aggressively, resulting in
higher incidences of upcoding. This study is the first to empirically investigate physician
personality characteristics that determine upcoding and downcoding behavior and suggests that
physician payment policies, to be effective, must neutralize the effect of physician personality on
code selection and reimbursement outcomes.
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION

“I went to medical school to be a doctor, not to be a coder!...The rules are too confusing,”
a physician exclaimed with frustration after failing a coding audit (S. Champagnie, personal
communication, June 16, 2020). Unfortunately, his sentiments are not uncommon. Physicians
across the United States are burdened with the pressure of accurate coding while trying to
maintain quality patient care. Physician coding errors cost the U.S. government billions of
dollars in incorrect payments. Despite the economic importance of coding accuracy,
investigators have not reached consensus on the factors that contribute to coding errors. Further,
there is little understanding of the variation in physician coding behavior. This study aims to fill
this gap by investigating physician characteristics that explain the variation in physician coding
accuracy, specifically upcoding and downcoding errors.
Physicians bill for patient office visits using evaluation and management codes;
(hereafter referred to as E/M codes); these codes represent the most common type of physician
coding error and are 50% more likely to be paid incorrectly (Department of Health and Human
Services, 2014). In Calendar Year 2018, more than one-third (33%) of the top 20 incorrectly paid
outpatient services were physician office visits. The incorrect payments attributed to these
outpatient services were more than $8.6 billion (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
2019). Therefore, office visits represent a major area of concern for the Department of Health
and Human Service office of the Inspector General (OIG). In 2016, the OIG reported the first
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reduction in overall errors since 2010 (See Figure 1.2). While overall error rates declined, E/M
coding errors remained virtually flat. (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2017).
As Figure 1.2 illustrates, in each subsequent year after 2016, the overall error rates (for all
medical expenditures) continued to decline while the Part B error rate, which represents
physician services, consistently exceeded the overall error rate, with modest declines year after
year. This discrepancy between the performance of the overall error rates and the Part B error
rates suggests physician office visit coding has not received sufficient attention of healthcare
policy initiatives.
In its annual Improper Payment Rate report, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS), a national health insurance program in the United States that primarily covers
the elderly and low-income enrollees, documents the pervasiveness of physician coding errors.
CMS’s improper payment rate is the net difference of overpaid and underpaid services based on
a sample of claims audited. The billions of dollars CMS pays annually in improper payments
underscores the propensity of physicians to over-charge for their services. In the literature, overcharging, which results in overpaid services, is often referred to as upcoding while
undercharging, which results in underpaid services, is referred to as downcoding (See figure 1.3
for net overpayments from 2015 to 2018).
While the federal government focuses its efforts on upcoding errors, little is known about
the economic impact of downcoding, particularly to physician practices. Multiple studies found
evidence that downcoding occurs as frequently as upcoding (Chao et al., 1998; Kikano,
Goodwin, & Stange, 2000; King, Lipsky, & Sharp, 2002). One such study of 104 medical
records found a 9.2% downcoding rate (Ayub et al., 2019; Zafirah, Nur, Puteh, & Aljunid, 2018).
These findings suggest that CMS’s auditing efforts may be biased towards services more
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susceptible to upcoding while ignoring services that are likely to be downcoded. Upcoding errors
subject the physician organization to fines and penalties, and downcoding errors subject the
physician organization to loss of revenue. Therefore, the challenge for practitioners is to improve
physician billing accuracy so that both upcoding and downcoding errors are diminished.
To date, little consensus exists in the literature on the key contributory factors of billing
accuracy. Some researchers attribute errors to ambiguous coding guidelines and inadequate
training, yet others assert that self-interest and greed are key factors in coding accuracy. The
ambiguity of the E/M coding system is depicted in the numerous studies highlighting low
concordance rates, which is identified as evidence of a flawed coding system (King et al., 2002;
Zuber et al., 2000). Others argue that residency programs fail to train and prepare new physicians
in coding and billing guidelines (Andreae, Dunham, & Freed, 2009; Howard & Reddy, 2018;
Nguyen, O'Mara, & Powell, 2017; Varacallo, Wolf, & Martin, 2017). Despite increasing
antifraud efforts, some researchers maintain the motivations of greed and profit-maximizing
behavior are the true culprits for high upcoding errors (Lorence & Richards, 2002). However,
these conclusions are often anecdotal and lack empirical analysis.
Improving upcoding and downcoding errors, first requires an understanding of the
physician characteristics that lead to these differences in coding behavior. The CMS uses a
variety of behavior modification techniques, including fines and penalties, to discourage
improper billing (Doan, 2011). Physicians respond to these techniques to different degrees, and
the success of these techniques is limited by the extent to which physician personality
characteristics respond to disincentives and penalties. Alternatively, physicians who lack the
requisite coding knowledge and training do not have the desired response to the CMS’s behavior
modification policies. Penalties do not improve coding accuracy where knowledge and training
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are lacking. Instead, the enforcement approach may lead to more incidences of downcoding by
physicians who do not want to risk government penalties.
To fully understand this topic, it is necessary to provide contextual background on the
fee-for-service payment system, the far-reaching implications of medical billing errors, the
degree of complexity and judgment required for E/M coding and the role of medical
documentation in determining coding accuracy. The remaining sections of this chapter provides
this context and ends with an overview of the role of technology in the coding and billing
process.
The Problem with the Fee-For-Service Payment Model
In the “fee-for-service” model of reimbursement, physicians are paid specific amounts
based on the medical code billed. The CMS assigns each billing code a reimbursement value
based on the relative intensity and resources utilized to provide the service (Kumetz & Goodson,
2013). Using this method, physicians have great latitude in assigning billing codes to designate
the cognitive intensity of the service they provide. A one unit increase in the billing code level
could increase physician payment by as much as 68%, posing a significant incentive to upcode.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the relative percentage increase in payment for each subsequent level of
established patient visit evaluation and management (E/M) billing code. To put the motivation to
upcode in perspective, let’s assume a family practice physician sees an average of 100 patients
per week and works an average of 50 weeks per year (Yarnall, Pollak, Østbye, Krause, &
Michener, 2003). Using 2019 payment rates, a family practice physician could potentially
increase his annual revenues by $290,000 simply by upcoding his office visits by one level from
99213 to 99214 1.

1

Increase in annual revenues is calculated as follows: $58 payment differential between 99213 and 99214 multiplied
by 100 patients per week, multiplied by 50 working weeks per year.
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E/M billing codes are the most common in the medical management of a patient and,
arguably, the most confusing and prone to coding errors (Patel, 2010). Critics assert that
physicians often choose the wrong code because the code choices do not adequately reflect their
scope of work and intensity of effort (Kumetz & Goodson, 2013). For example, if a physician
believes that the cognitive effort expended to diagnose and treat a chronically ill patient with
multiple co-morbidities is not adequately reflected in the billing codes for that service, he/she
may choose to bill for a higher code than warranted by the coding guidelines. Conversely, other
studies show that physicians often undervalue time-intensive services such as patient counseling
and coordination of care (Chao et al., 1998; Kikano et al., 2000; King et al., 2002). These studies
suggest a discordance between physicians’ valuation of their services and the current payment
methodology. Until the physician payment system is fundamentally reformed, evaluation and
management coding will remain vulnerable to upcoding.
The fee-for-service payment model has its foundation in the Resource-based Relative
Value Scale (RBRVS). Consequently, any payment reform must first address the foundational
problems of the relative-value scale conventions. The RBRVS assigns numerical values, referred
to as relative value units, to physician services to quantify the relative work and cost of these
services. Relative value units have three components: the value of the physician’s work (such as
time and intensity of the services provided), the physicians practice expense and the physicians
malpractice costs (Brunt, 2011). Each E/M code is assigned a unique relative value unit and
forms the basis of the payment for that service (Brunt, 2011). To provide adequate compensation
to physicians, the relative value units therefore must accurately reflect the cognitive and
procedural intensity of the services provided. Upcoding errors and subsequently improper
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payments occur when physicians disagree, and previously cited studies suggest they often
disagree, with the relative value assigned to their service.
Implications of Medical Coding Errors
Attempting to contain staggering healthcare costs, the CMS continues to increase its
auditing of healthcare physicians; the audits are aimed at curbing improper claim payments.
Consequently, physicians face severe consequences from incorrect medical billing, rising
administrative costs from defending against government audits, lost revenue from monies
recovered by the CMS, and in extreme cases, criminal and civil penalties from fraudulent billing
practices.
Upcoding errors are considered fraud and may be punishable under the Federal False
Claims Act (Buck, 2015). Undoubtedly, some unscrupulous physicians and non-physician
practitioners (hereinafter referred to collectively as physicians) routinely upcode their services.
However, there is concern that upcoding errors may also result from a myriad of contributory
factors – such as a lack of education and an overly complex billing system - that, together, have
created billions of dollars in improper payments (Buck, 2015; King et al., 2002; Maxham, 2014).
The most significant implications of billing errors are described further below.
Legal Implications
The federal government empowers several agencies to use expansive methods, including
criminal and civil sanctions, to deter fraud and abuse of its public healthcare programs. The False
Claims Act (FCA), enacted in 1863 and most recently revised in 2010, is the federal
government’s primary tool for combatting Medicare fraud. Under the False Claims Act, a
physician found guilty of submitting false claims is subject to civil penalties of not less than
$5,000 and not more than $10,000 plus three times the amount of damages the Government
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sustains (Doan, 2011). These penalties are assessed per claim and can rapidly multiply. Under
the Qui Tam provision, whistleblowers can sue a healthcare entity on behalf of the federal
government and, if successful, receive a reward of up to 25% of the penalties assessed.
In its enforcement arsenal, the federal government can exclude a physician’s participation
from all government programs. With more than half of the U.S. population insured by public
programs, exclusion from government reimbursement would force most physician organizations
out of practice. While the OIG maintains that innocent errors cannot be prosecuted (subject only
to the return of monies received plus interest), it does not clearly define “innocent errors” and
considers upcoding an area of special interest in its fraud detection efforts (Office of Inspector
General, 2000).
A long-standing concern has been that the False Claims Act (FCA) can easily cripple
already struggling physician organizations for innocent upcoding errors (Buck, 2015; Doan,
2011; Hyman, 2002; Maxham, 2014). According to some OIG estimates, 30% – 40% of all
medical claims contain a billing mistake, which can be attributed to the complexity of medical
billing (Office of Inspector General, 2000). One health care Attorney asserts that “a law
originally enacted to combat rampant contractor fraud during the civil war, is now being used to
subject physicians to harsh penalties for what could be inadvertent billing mistakes” (Maxham,
2014). Another health care Attorney argues the False Claims Act is tantamount to
overcriminalization and overenforcement; the Attorney asserts, “rather than focusing on the
worse actors, it has the effect of ensnaring innocent physicians” (Buck, 2015). To escape civil or
criminal litigation, physicians must take precautionary measures to safeguard their billing
accuracy.
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Financial Implications
The healthcare reimbursement system is complex. Multiple payers with their own billing
rules, coupled with Medicare’s myriad regulations, create costly administrative complexity
(Blanchfield, Heffernan, Osgood, Sheehan, & Meyer, 2010; Lee & Blanchfield, 2018).
Administrative costs are estimated at 25% to 31% of total health care expenditures in the United
States, a proportion twice the one in Canada and significantly greater than in all other
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development member nations (Tseng, Kaplan, &
Schulman, 2018). Most administrative costs in the U.S. health care system (at least 62% based
on prior studies) have been attributed to billing and insurance related activities (Blanchfield et
al., 2010; Tseng et al., 2018). These administrative expenses have been directly connected to the
cost of compliance with the reimbursement system, including staffing resources for the sole
purpose of performing pre-emptive internal coding audits, justifying billing codes, and appealing
monies taken back (Blanchfield et al., 2010). Using cost-accounting approaches, some
researchers estimate the administrative burden at nearly 12% of net physician revenue (Jiwani,
Himmelstein, Woolhandler, & Kahn, 2014; Tseng et al., 2018; Woolhandler, Campbell, &
Himmelstein, 2003).
In addition to the financial burden created by the administrative complexity of billing and
coding rules, several studies found that physicians lose reimbursement from the high rate of
downcoding (Brennan & Probe, 2011; Duszak, Blackham, Kusiak, & Majchrzak, 2004; Holt,
Warsy, & Wright, 2010). Downcoding was also prevalent in studies outside of the United States.
Studies in Canada and Malaysia found significant missed revenue opportunities from
downcoding (Zafirah et al., 2018). While upcoding is considered fraud and punishable by any
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number of legal consequences previously discussed, downcoding goes unnoticed, and the lost
reimbursement is rarely recaptured (Ng & Lawless, 2001).
National Economic Implications
National healthcare expenditures place significant pressure on public-sector budgets,
making healthcare reform a major political issue. Healthcare spending is projected to outpace
Gross Domestic Product growth from the 2018 to 2027 period and anticipated to reach nearly $6
trillion by 2027 (Keehan, 2017). While numerous factors contribute to the growth in healthcare
spending, improper payments due to billing errors continue to be a high-value target (Jiwani et
al., 2014). Every year, the federal government reports billions of dollars in unjustified claim
payments. While researchers debate the exact economic impact, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation estimates 3% to 10% of national healthcare spending can be attributed to fraudulent
billing activities (Blanchfield et al., 2010; Keehan, 2017).
Health Policy Implications
Billing errors not only strain the U.S. healthcare budget, but they also threaten the quality
and continuity of patient care. Incorrectly coded procedures or poorly documented medical
reports undermine the “picture” of a patient’s health and compromise another physician’s ability
to treat the patient’s illness adequately. On a global scale, billing errors lead to poor data quality,
which jeopardizes national and international population health comparisons and healthcare
policy decisions.
Brief Overview of Evaluation and Management (E/M) Coding System
The E/M coding system is based on a set of guidelines prepared by the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS); E/M coding was instituted in 1992 and last revised in
1997. Since its inception, the E/M coding system has come under sharp criticism for being too
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ambiguous and subjective (King et al., 2002) as well as not adequately reimbursing for the depth
and breadth of physician services (Kikano et al., 2000; Kumetz & Goodson, 2013). Incorrect
E/M code assignment may result in non-payment of medical services provided and prosecution
for fraudulent billing. Several parameters are required to determine the correct E/M code
assignment. The following sections describe the commonly used E/M codes and demonstrate the
complexity of selecting the appropriate E/M codes.
All outpatient encounters are coded using evaluation and management codes. The first
face-to-face encounter a physician has with a patient and all subsequent face-to-face encounters
require E/M coding. Outpatient visits have five levels of E/M codes. Level 1 codes reflect the
least complex patient encounter and, correspondingly, the lowest level of reimbursement.
Accordingly, level 5 codes represent the most complex patient encounter and the highest level of
reimbursement.
The assignment of E/M codes is a complex process. The American Medical Association
Current Procedural Terminology E/M Services Guidelines outline three key components that
should be used in defining the level of E/M services, which are:
1.

History

2.

Examination

3.

Medical decision making

Each key component has its own set of intricate requirements to further define the appropriate
level of service.
History and Examination
The guidelines define four types of History: Problem Focused, Expanded Problem
Focused, Detailed, and Comprehensive. The extent to which the type of history is documented
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for the patient visit is dependent upon the nature of the presenting problem (the chief complaint)
and clinical judgment.
As with History, the nature of the presenting problem and clinical judgment determine
the extent of the examination performed. There are also four levels of examination that
correspond to the four levels of history. Responding to the cries from several medical societies,
in 2021, the CMS has agreed to simplify E/M coding by eliminating history and examination as a
requirement in determining the level of service. While physicians will still be required to
document the history and examination, medical decision making and the amount of time spent on
the encounter become the determinants of the levels billed. Table 1.1 in the appendix shows the
current guidelines for the various determinants of the four levels of examination and the type of
history.
Medical Decision Making
Medical Decision Making is the third key component and the most subjective, confusing
element of the entire patient encounter, but it is arguably the most important component for
determining the E/M code assignment. Essentially, this component measures the physician’s
cognitive functioning required to evaluate and treat the patient. As with the other components,
specific requirements exist for this section; however, studies have proven repeatedly that a
physician’s subjective assessment of his/her cognitive functioning often varies from the
assessment of an outside auditor. Nonetheless, the E/M services guidelines state that medical
decision making is measured specifically by:
1.

The number of possible diagnoses and/or the number of management options that

must be considered. It is easier to decide regarding an established diagnosis rather than an
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undiagnosed problem, which may require much more detailed workup and cognitive decision
making.
2.

The amount and/or complexity of medical records, diagnosis tests, and/or other

information that must be obtained, reviewed, and analyzed. This section is based on diagnostic
data that is ordered or reviewed. It also includes decisions to obtain or review prior medical
records and the patient’s history from other sources. The more data reviewed, the greater the
complexity and cognitive functioning involved.
3.

The risk of significant complications, morbidity, and or mortality as well as co-

morbidities associated with the patient’s presenting problem(s), the diagnostic procedures(s),
and/or the possible management options. The determination of a patient’s risk is a complex
process that involves anticipating the potential progression of the patient’s disease process and
the risk to the patient of selecting any of the diagnostic and disease management options. The
highest level of risk in any one category (presenting problem, diagnostic procedures, or
management options) determines the overall level of risk.
Table 1.2 illustrates how the number of diagnoses, amount and complexity of data, and
risk of complications are combined to determine the type of medical decision making utilized.
Time-based Coding
Recognizing that physicians do not control the length or content of every visit and that
instances arise where factors besides history, exam, and medical decision making would be
necessary to good quality of care, an exception was made to allow billing based on time in lieu
of the three key components described above. To ensure physicians were not penalized for
spending time answering a patient’s questions, the E/M guidelines also include selection criteria
when counseling and coordination of care constituted more than half of the total time spent with
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the patient. See Table 3.1 for the threshold times for each level of service for an established
office patient visit.
Assignment of E/M Code
Once the key components of a service have been determined, they are combined to assign
an E/M code. The higher the E/M code, the more complex the service, and therefore the higher
the reimbursement to the physician. Table 1.4 provides an example of how the different levels of
History, Examination, and Medical Decision Making contribute to assigning a code for an
established patient in an office or outpatient setting.
This method of reimbursement, coupled with the subjectivity of the E/M code
assignment, forms the basis of much of the debate surrounding the factors driving E/M coding
errors. Some argue that physicians have a perverse incentive to upcode, or scale up their services
in an attempt to increase revenues (Chen, 2015). This argument hinges on the belief that the
ambiguity of the E/M coding guidelines, along with the latitude physicians have in choosing the
appropriate E/M code, encourage physicians to choose better paying codes when alternative,
lower paying codes may be more appropriate (Brunt, 2011). Yet, others argue the subjective
nature of the E/M guidelines makes assigning codes more of an art than a science. The low
concordance rates of coders, auditors, and physicians is presented as evidence that financial
incentives are not to blame for upcoding services. In fact, these researchers note that upcoding is
as common as downcoding (Chao et al., 1998; Kikano et al., 2000; King et al., 2002).
The Role of Medical Documentation in Billing Accuracy
In 1995, CMS (then known as Health Care Finance Administration) and the American
Medical Association (AMA) published the “Documentation Guidelines for E/M Services.” The
intention of these guidelines was to further enhance and clarify the reliability and validity of the
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E/M code definitions. Despite the definitions provided, physicians found the terms “brief,”
“extended,” “comprehensive,” and “detailed” very subjective. To improve accurate coding and
reimbursement, CMS developed a 15-page document (which was modified into a 40-page
document in 1997) describing the criteria for bridging the gap between the contents of the
medical record and the E/M code billed. These guidelines inextricably linked the medical
documentation to the E/M coding assignment by explaining in detail the data elements that must
be present in the medical record to support the subjective terms in the definitions.
The E/M documentation guidelines created a direct correlation between the thoroughness
of the physician’s substantiating documentation and the accuracy of the medical coding. During
a patient visit, a doctor notates the examination, procedures performed, other information about
the patient and the encounter, and a plan of treatment for the patient (Swigert, 2006). The
documentation forms the justification for the scope and level of the E/M service (complexity or
time spent) (Holt et al., 2010; Howard & Reddy, 2018). Therefore, physicians must ensure their
medical documentation is thorough and complete since it is the standard by which appropriate
coding is judged and the basis for punitive and legal action against a provider for incorrect
coding and billing (Howard & Reddy, 2018). The advent of Electronic Medical Records (EMRs)
was expected to improve documentation accuracy and reduce healthcare costs, yet decades after
its implementation, no evidence of cost reduction exists. Additionally, heightened concern exists
over the accuracy and integrity of EMR documentation (Rohr, 2015; Shachak & Reis, 2010)
The Role of Technology
Practitioners were hopeful that the introduction of EMRs would improve billing accuracy
by alleviating the inherent task complexity in medical coding and the poor quality of medical
record documentation (Bowman, 2013). In 2009, the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act
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set aside more than $30 billion in financial incentives to stimulate EMR adoption. Despite
evidence of high rates of EMR adoption, concerns about medical documentation and the related
billing accuracy remain, suggesting a failure in EMR capabilities to effectively offset coding and
billing errors (Shachak & Reis, 2010).
If leveraged appropriately, EMRs could help ensure that medical record documentation is
complete, accurate, and supports medical coding. For example, many EMRs have built-in dropdown lists and templates that aid the physician in the correct code selection and in creating more
complete documentation (Kabene, 2010; Kumar & Thomas, 2011). Computer-Assisted-Coding
software can also integrate with the EMR to suggest the correct code based on the physician’s
documentation. These capabilities have great potential to reduce reliance on the physician to
remember all code choices and relevant documentation to support the code choices.
However, several studies have cited concern about the unintended consequences of EMR
systems (Bowman, 2013; Rohr, 2015). In her study of medical data quality in EMR systems,
Bowman (2013) asserts that with the emergence of EMRs, rather than an improvement in data
quality, a greater quantity of bad data is recorded in the medical record, which is attributed to 1)
improper system use, 2) poor system design, and 3) inappropriate documentation capture.
Though EMR features, such as standardized templates, “point and click,” drop-down lists, and
copy-paste functions, are helpful in reducing the physician’s cognitive load, they are shown to
increase errors and contribute to poor data quality (Rohr, 2015; Shachak & Reis, 2010). Coding
assisted software, which has the potential to reduce coding errors, is not widely adopted in
physician practices (Shaffer et al., 2017). Perhaps the adoption of coding assisted software was
hindered by the intense scrutiny of the Office of Inspector General for Health and Human
Services for its linkage to an increase in coding errors in the early 1990’s (Office of the Inspector
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General, 1994). These errors (even if unintentional) have serious ramifications for fraud and
abuse and are linked with upcoding errors, specifically in evaluation and management billing
codes (Cearnal, 2013.)
Evaluation and management coding is clearly a problem deserving of health policy
attention. The complexity of the coding system, its inherent subjectivity, and the failure of the
resourced-based valuation system to adequately capture physician effort makes the fee-forservice payment system vulnerable to underpayment and overpayment errors. Electronic medical
records have not had the anticipated positive impact and the diffusion of coding-assisted
software has been limited at best. Any attempts to reform the current physician payment system
must consider the contributory factors to medical billing errors. Understanding the physician
characteristics that attenuate billing accuracy, by fostering upcoding and downcoding errors, is a
good first step towards this worthy endeavor.
Tables
Table 1.1. Components of E/M History and Examination for Established Patient.
Presenting
Problem
(Chief
Complaint)

History of
Present
Illness

Review of
Systems

Past Family
and Social
History

Required

Brief (1 to 3
elements)

Not
Required

Not
Required

Required

Brief (1 to 3
elements)

Problem
pertinent

Not
Required

Detailed

Required

Extended (4
or more
elements)

Extended

Pertinent

Comprehens
ive

Required

Extended (4
or more
elements)

Complete

Complete

Type of
History
Problem
Focused
Expanded
problemfocused

Examination
A limited examination of the affected body area
or organ system
A limited examination of the affected body area
or organ system and any other symptomatic or
related body area (s) or organ system (s)
An extended examination of the affected body
area or organ system and any other symptomatic
or related body area (s) or organ system (s)
A general multisystem examination or complete
examination of a single organ system and other
symptomatic or related body area (as) or organ
system (s).

Table 1.2. Determination of Complexity of Medical Decision Making.
Type of Medical
Decision Making

Number of diagnoses or
management options

Straightforward
Low complexity
Moderate complexity
High Complexity

Minimal
Limited
Multiple
Extensive

Amount and/or
complexity of data to be
reviewed
Minimal to None
Limited
Moderate
Extensive
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Risk of complications
and/or morbidity or
mortality
Minimal
Low
Moderate
High

Table 1.3. E/M Code Assignment for an Established Office Patient. *
Code
99211
99212
99213
99214
99215

History
Minimal Service
(Physician not required)
Problem Focused
Expanded Problem
Focused
Detailed
Comprehensive

Examination

Medical Decision
Making

Time
(minutes)

2019 Medicare
Reimbursement

N/A

N/A

5

$45.36

Problem Focused
Expanded
Problem Focused
Detailed
Comprehensive

Straightforward

10

$76.36

Low Complexity

15

$109.80

Moderate Complexity
High Complexity

25
40

$167.40
$210.60

* Adapted from American Medical Association and CMS 2019 Physician Fee Schedule
(Unadjusted National Rates).
Figures

Figure 1.1. Percentage Increase in Physician Payment for each E/M level increase for an
Established Patient Visit. *
* Adapted from American Medical Association and CMS 2019 Physician Fee Schedule
(Unadjusted National Rates).

Figure 1.2. Comparison of US Billing Error Rates for all Medicare Medical Expenditures to Part
B only Billing Error Rates (2015-2018). *
* US Department of Health and Human Services Improper Payment Rate Reports 2015 -2018.
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Figure 1.3. Comparison of Total Medicare Medical Expenditures Paid in Error compared to Part
B Medical Expenditures Paid in Error in Billions of Dollars (2015-2018). *
* US Department of Health and Human Services Improper Payment Rate Reports 2015 -2018.
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CHAPTER TWO:
LITERATURE REVIEW

Research Protocol
According to Hart (2018), a good literature review justifies the inclusion and exclusion
criteria of sources to demonstrate the relevance of selected articles. This paper utilized a
systematic, heuristic, and iterative approach to identifying and selecting the most relevant
research papers. The exact methodology used to identify relevant sources for this study is
detailed in figure 2.1.
Systematic: As this study is focused on the healthcare domain, the search began with the
OVID Health Journals database, using the following keywords: “physician coding,” “coding
accuracy,” “billing fraud,” “evaluation and management,” and “up-coding.” The initial search
returned 186 articles. To reduce the findings to the most relevant articles, inclusion criteria were
set to articles whose abstracts included the five relevant keywords. This method returned 16
articles. After a full-text review of each article based on its relevance to the research study, four
articles were selected for inclusion in the paper. Articles that did not focus on physician practices
(i.e. focused on hospitals and inpatient procedures) or were not relevant to evaluation and
management errors (i.e. focused on supplies or diagnosis codes) were eliminated.
Next, using the same keywords from the previous search, the search was expanded to
include peer-reviewed articles in the ABI/Inform Global, Academic Search Premier, and Science
Direct databases. This search produced 331 results. Again, the search parameters were refined by
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limiting the keyword search to the abstracts, which resulted in 41 articles. Nine articles were
retained after a full text review.
Heuristic: The search methodology first focused on articles specific to E/M coding
errors. To capture the impact of recent technological advances on coding accuracy (such as
advances in computer assisted coding software and electronic medical records), the search
criteria were expanded to include articles published in the past 10 years on healthcare
information technology. This search produced six relevant articles.
Iterative: An additional 30 relevant sources were found in the bibliographies of the
selected articles. Using the heuristic criteria and sourcing for frequently cited authors, an
additional 19 articles were selected to include in the literature review. This methodology resulted
in a final list of 38 articles. The literature review process and article selection methodology are
depicted in Figure 2.1.
There are three dominant streams of arguments found in the literature to explain
physician billing accuracy. First, knowledge and training play a central role and has been used to
explain both upcoding and downcoding errors. A second stream of arguments attribute physician
billing errors to the complexity of the coding system. Third, another group of researchers posit
physicians are motivated by greed, which according to this group, the fee-for-service payment
system incentivizes this behavior. We explore each of these arguments in the sections that
follow.
Training and Knowledge Gaps
The American Medical Association sets forth physician training standards such that “a
resident is prepared to undertake independent practice…on the satisfactory completion of
residency” (AMA, 2005, p. 30). Accurate medical documentation, which is the foundation for
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the medical code, must be a core competency in medical education programs. To support these
educational goals, the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) sets
forth specific competencies in documentation of procedures and diagnoses, noting that
procedural teaching should include “appropriate coding and charging” (ACGME, 2005, p. 31).
Despite these mandates, the literature identifies a knowledge deficit in physician coding and
billing and calls for graduate programs to do more to prepare residents for practice. Studies
conducted between 2000 and 2017 consistently find physicians lacking in knowledge and
residency programs lacking in adequate education to help residents master the documentation
and coding process (Howard & Reddy, 2018; Ng & Lawless, 2001).
The literature commonly cites knowledge as a key contributory factor to billing accuracy.
Several studies demonstrate a knowledge gap by testing physicians’ coding knowledge. For
example, in their study on billing accuracy, Cohen et al. (2001) assert that, based on their
knowledge test scores, clinicians are not prepared to enter practice. These assertions are based on
an empirical test of coding concepts that resulted in mean scores of 2.27 on a 10-point scale.
Similar studies agree that medical students are poorly prepared in the area of accurate medical
coding, citing billing accuracy rates as low as 33% and poor medical record documentation (Holt
et al., 2010; Howard & Reddy, 2018). Each of these studies demonstrates a gap in knowledge
and billing accuracy.
While only a few studies empirically tested the relationship between training and
knowledge on coding accuracy, the literature clearly illustrates that many physicians enter
practice without sufficient coding training (Adams, Norman, & Burroughs, 2002). Two such
studies conducted educational interventions and, over a period of time, demonstrated significant
improvements in billing accuracy (Jones, 2008; Varacallo et al., 2017). Jones et al. (2008)
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asserted that residents complete their training with minimal knowledge of coding and
demonstrate an improvement in coding accuracy from 36% to 88% after a series of ten (10)
monthly lectures. Almost a decade later, Varacallo et al. (2017) showed similar results. Their
training intervention of 32 residents improved coding accuracy from 53.8% to 85.4%.
Several other studies tested the training hypothesis through surveys of physicians’
awareness of coding and billing guidelines or by surveying physicians’ self-perceptions of
training adequacy (Adiga, Buss, & Beasley, 2006; Andreae et al., 2009). In their study of the
adequacy of billing and coding training for 1,233 pediatric graduates, Andreae, Dunham, and
Freed (2009) concluded that pediatric residency programs fail to prepare new graduates for legal
and financial responsibilities of medical billing and coding. Ng and Lawless (2002) noted similar
results in their study of 344 outpatient clinic charts, concluding “when pediatric residents are not
trained adequately in proper coding practices, the potential for billing discrepancies is high and
potential reimbursement differences may be substantial” (p. 827). A study conducted by Adiga,
Buss, and Beasley (2006) demonstrated that second year internal medicine residents across the
country have a low level of understanding of Medicare billing, which they correlated to low test
scores in this area. In a 2006 survey of graduating orthopedic residents, more than 90% felt that
formal training in documentation and coding was necessary in residency, and only 13% stated
they felt confident in their ability to start coding by their first day as an attending (Gill & Schutt,
2007). The literature suggests that despite the financial and legal consequences at stake,
documentation and billing are not performed well by many physicians. Formal education in
medical billing and coding is an essentially needed component of the medical curriculum
(Agrawal, Taitsman, & Cassel, 2013; Ng & Lawless, 2001).
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Experience, Not a Proxy for Adequate Training
Residents enter practice unprepared for the knowledge requirements for accurate billing
and coding, but the literature shows experienced physicians also exhibit poor billing accuracy.
While some evidence notes that physicians with more years of experience have higher
knowledge scores (Cohen & Marculescu, 2001), there is limited evidence that their experience
and knowledge have translated to higher coding accuracy (Holt et al., 2010; Kikano et al., 2000;
King et al., 2002; Zuber et al., 2000). While it is reasonable that a physician with several years of
coding and billing experience would have a high level of billing accuracy, the literature does not
support this assertion.
Although counter-intuitive, several studies show no relationship between a physician’s
years of coding and his/her billing accuracy (Holt et al., 2010; King et al., 2002; Zuber et al.,
2000). These studies suggest though a physician is an expert in determining the patient’s
diagnostic and procedural conditions, his/her knowledge and experience in the assignment of the
relevant codes for these conditions may be limited. One study found that downcoding and
upcoding occurred at the same rate for attending physicians as well as residents, suggesting
experience does not play a significant role in billing accuracy (Chao et al., 1998). In their study
of 1,069 patient charts from 10 family physician offices, Zuber et al. (2000) found no statistical
difference in code accuracy between resident physicians with 2.3 years of coding experience and
attending physicians with 23.3 years of coding experience. These conclusions point to alternative
arguments to explain billing accuracy, namely, the complexity of the coding system and the
perverse incentives created under the fee-for-service payment system.
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Perverse Incentives
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) determines how physicians are
reimbursed for their services. In collaboration with the American Medical Association, CMS
designates the exact amount to pay physicians for specific services provided. Some researchers
claim the fee-for-service payment system invites the submission of false claims. They argue that
this system of reimbursing a physician’s work creates a perverse incentive to bill for work not
actually performed or to perform and bill for a higher level of service than warranted. One
research scholar states, “One of the major root causes of the cost crisis in American health care
is…a result of America’s structural inefficiencies and upside-down incentives that encourage
health care professionals to constantly provide more and more expensive- health care (Buck,
2015). Critics of the healthcare reimbursement system posit that it rewards volume rather than
the value of care; therefore, physicians are incentivized to overuse health care services (Chen,
2015).
Due to the fee-for-service payment system, the more work produced, regardless of its
quality, the more a provider is paid. Some work carries a higher level of reimbursement;
therefore, physicians may be motivated to bend the rules to obtain the higher reimbursement.
Within the system, a 26% to 68% payment differential occurs for each higher level of coding
(see Figure 1.1). Consequently, some researchers assert that under conditions where the
physician has to choose between the highest possible billable code or the appropriate code for
service provided, the higher billable code often prevails (Adams et al., 2002; Brunt, 2011).
Similarly, Lorence et al. (2002) and Brunt et al. (2011) argue that the financial incentive
to optimize reimbursement largely outweighs the risk of government anti-fraud enforcement
efforts. In their empirical analysis, Brunt et al. (2011) developed a model of physician behavior
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that suggests for a risk-adverse, utility maximizing physician, the decision to upcode may be
correlated with Medicare’s fee differential between the correct code and higher code, Medicare’s
reimbursement rate for the lower code, the physician’s attitude towards risk, and the likelihood
and penalties of being caught. The key empirically testable hypothesis from this model is that
upcoding is more likely to occur the larger the fee differential problem.
Upcoding is a problem in both office visits and hospital stays. Silverman and Skinner
(2004) found upcoding ranged from 10% to 37% for pneumonia and respiratory infections across
a variety of hospitals. Dafny (2005) observed that the primary response of hospitals was to
upcode services that generated the largest price increases. Bellows and Halpin (2008) noted that
mental health providers often exaggerated the mental health symptoms of their patients, thereby
billing a higher revenue-generating code than warranted. Finally, Seiber (2007) estimated that
upcoding contributed to a 2.2% increase in Medicaid’s total annual expenditure. These studies
provide strong evidence that the fee-for-service payment system creates perverse incentives for
physicians to increase their revenue by over-representing the services provided.
Complexity of Coding Guidelines
A large body of studies documents that physicians are frequently inaccurate in their
coding. Many of these studies suggest that coding errors are a natural consequence of the
ambiguity and complexity inherent in coding guidelines (Kikano et al., 2000; King et al., 2002;
Zuber et al., 2000). These arguments note that coding rules are largely subjective and often lead
to different results and a high inherent error rate when applied by multiple users (King et al.,
2002). In each study, the concordance rate of coding experts and inter-rater reliability were used
as proxies for the complexity and ambiguity of the coding guidelines.
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Concordance rates across numerous studies showed little agreement among expert coders
in their interpretation of the E/M coding guidelines. As early as 1998, Chao et al. examined the
concordance of 138 family physicians with trained coding experts and found billing codes were
concordant for only 55% of the encounters. In a similar study, Zuber et al. (2000) sought to
understand if expert coders could agree on the correct code and found 29.2% of physicians
agreed with an experienced faculty family practice physician and that physicians agreed with
professional coders only 51.7% of the time. Almost a decade later, Kikano et al. (2009) noted
concordance rates had yet to improve. Their study examined the concordance rate of family
physician billing codes with those based on medical record review from certified coders and
found that 57% of billed codes agreed. Hwang et al. (2006) found complete intercode agreement
with professional coders on 55% of ophthalmology cases.
These studies underscore a prevalent concern in the literature: physicians cannot correctly
apply coding guidelines because the E/M coding system is ambiguous and too complex to be
uniformly applied (Chao et al., 1998; Kikano et al., 2000; King et al., 2002; Zuber et al., 2000).
One investigator describes Medicare as “an amazing array…of reporting, coding and billing
rules…and a complete alphabet soup of... intricacies involved in providing healthcare services”
(Doan, 2011, pg. 57).
The complexity of the current coding guidelines makes it difficult to distinguish between
fraud and a billing mistake (Doan, 2011). In several of these studies, physicians, auditors, and
coders attempted to accurately code using hypothetical cases, so they did not have any external
incentives. Nonetheless, their concordance rates remained dismally low. In their study of the
coding and billing patterns of orthopedic trauma surgeons, Brennan et al. (2011) found that
although physicians understood the negative consequences of billing and coding errors, the
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system was so complex that physicians did not put forth the effort to learn to accurately perform
the task.
Similarly, Cohen et al. (2001) posited that strengthening the medical practitioner’s
attitudes and knowledge towards correct coding would subsequently lead to an improvement in
accuracy. In their investigation, Cohen et al. (2001) administered a survey evaluating attitudes
towards medical coding to 69 medical practitioners. They found that more than 74% of the
respondents reported not being confident in their coding skills because the system was too
confusing. Additionally, most respondents did not find this task to be a rewarding part of their
job because of its complexity; therefore, they did not put forth the effort to learn it, believed
coding was an added stressor, and found it difficult to code accurately due to time constraints.
Typically, coding was delegated to clerical billing staff, regardless of their level of coding and
billing education or experience. The authors argue that these negative attitudes towards coding
suggest a complacency towards coding accuracy that results in a lack of effort or concern for
learning and accurately applying coding guidelines.
Ultimately, any changes to the current system of reimbursement would need to be
championed by constituents such as Professional Medical Societies, the American Medical
Association and the CMS. In other words, the current structure of reimbursement, including the
system of penalties for coding errors, would require significant revision from actors outside the
physician organization. For the foreseeable future, the fee-for-service reimbursement system
remains the primary mechanism by which physicians will be paid for patient office visits.
The key contributory factors found in the literature for coding and billing errors are summarized
in Table 2.1.
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Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
The literature provides evidence of an ambiguous coding system with low inter-rater
reliability (Chao et al., 1998; King et al., 2002). Numerous studies on the accuracy of evaluation
and management billing found concordance rates of trained coding auditors and experienced
physicians ranging from 31% to 43% (Chao et al., 1998; Holt et al., 2010; Zuber et al., 2000). In
these studies, the authors found that low billing accuracy rates from downcoding were as
prevalent as low billing accuracy rates from upcoding. While a knowledge gap from inadequate
training is a plausible explanation for these low accuracy rates, they fail to explain why all
physicians do not suffer from high rates of coding errors. This study seeks to fill this gap in the
literature. Using self-efficacy theory and incorporating risk-taking attitudes, this study seeks to
explain physician characteristics that lead to low billing accuracy from upcoding or downcoding
errors.
Perceived Self Efficacy
Studies on decision-making have shown how individuals think and behave is far more
closely linked to perceived competence and only loosely related to actual skill (Krueger &
Dickson, 1994). The theory that performance and behavior is largely determined by an
individual’s belief in his ability to achieve specific goals and outcomes was first introduced by
Albert Bandura in the 1970s. Bandura (1978) makes a distinction between two very different
types of efficacious behavior. First is outcome-expectancy which he describes as the expectation
that one’s actions will bring about the desired results. Second is perceived self-efficacy, which in
contrast, is the personal confidence that one has the ability to carry out the required actions.
Researchers have since linked low perceived self-efficacy with an avoidance of difficult
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challenges (Imus, Burns & Weglarz, 2017) and a preoccupation with the risk of failure and
adverse consequences (Krueger et al., 1994).
According to self-efficacy theory, people may believe their actions may assist in
achieving a particular outcome but have little confidence in their abilities to execute the required
behavior (Bandura, 1997). People with low confidence in their abilities will have a low internal
locus of control. Consequently, they will lack the motivation to persevere in controlling
outcomes (Cohen & Marculescu, 2001). For example, physicians may believe that coding
accurately will achieve the appropriate level of reimbursement and ward off government audits
but have little confidence in their coding knowledge and abilities to accomplish this task. As a
consequence of low perceived self-efficacy, they may frequently code and bill for a lower level
of service (downcoding) to avoid government audits and accusations of fraud (Cohen &
Marculescu, 2001).
Given the ambiguity of the E/M coding system, its low inter-rater reliability, and a
significant coding knowledge deficit, it is not surprising that physicians lack confidence that they
can accurately select the correct E/M code. Further, as the literature shows, training has a
significant impact on physicians’ billing accuracy. Physicians who did not receive billing and
coding training in their resident curriculum or those who perceive the training as inadequate will
lack the necessary confidence and requisite self-efficacy for achieving high levels of billing
accuracy. It follows that physicians’ perceived self-efficacy will be a significant factor that
influences their coding behavior.
Physicians’ overall lack of confidence in their ability to code correctly leads to a low
perceived self-efficacy, resulting in low accuracy scores. Hence, we can expect to see less
undercoding errors when physicians are adequately trained, possess the necessary knowledge of
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medical billing and coding rules, and have confidence in their coding skills. The following three
hypotheses captures these claims:
H1a: There is a negative relationship between the physician’s coding knowledge and
downcoding.
H1b: There is a negative relationship between the physician’s perception of the adequacy
of training and downcoding.
H1c: There is a negative relationship between physicians’ perception of their coding
skills and downcoding.
Risk-Seeking Attitudes
A variety of instruments to assess physicians’ propensity for risk-taking and reactions to
uncertainty have been developed and tested (Geller, Tambor, Chase, & Holtzman, 1993; Gerrity,
Earp, Devellis, & Light, 1992). Developed in the 1970s, the Jackson Personality Index (JPI) is
one instrument used to describe a person’s whole personality profile via questions from 16
subscales that include areas such as self-esteem, innovation, social participation, tolerance, and
risk-taking (Jackson, 1975). The risk-taking subscale defines personalities as either “riskseekers” (those unconcerned with danger) and “risk-avoiders” (those who are cautious, hesitant,
and security-minded and have a general aversion of risk taking in life).
In 1990, Gerrity introduced a complementary measure of risk-taking called “stress from
uncertainty” (SUS) that is distinguished by its well documented psychometric properties and
relevance to medical situations (Gerrity et al., 1992). The Stress from Uncertainty Scale is
comprised of 13 questions that measure how physicians react under ambiguous and uncertain
conditions (i.e. anxiety, uneasiness, discomfort, emotional turmoil) (Gerrity, DeVellis, & Earp,
1990). It is the first validated scale of its kind to measure risk attitudes that specifically targets
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physicians’ personality risk profile and its relationship to medical decision making (Pearson et
al., 1995).
In 1995, Pearson et al. developed a new physician risk attitude scale that combined
Gerrity’s Stress from Uncertainty Scale and an abbreviated version of the JPI risk-taking
subscale. In the Pearson study, the number of questions were limited to the six questions (out of
the original 13 questions) most applicable to physicians (Pearson et al., 1995). This study builds
upon Pearson’s (1995) previous work and adapts the Pearson risk-taking scales for applicability
to medical coding decision making.
Risk-taking behaviors are determined in part by a person’s risk-seeking attitude. Riskseeking attitudes have been shown to influence physician medical decision making behaviors
under conditions of uncertainty (Arrieta, García-Prado, González, & Pinto-Prades, 2017; Fiscella
et al., 2000; Pearson et al., 1995; Veazie, McIntosh, Chapman, & Dolan, 2014). There is strong
evidence that differences in physicians’ risk-seeking attitudes may be among the root causes of
unexplained variation in medical decision making and the resulting healthcare expenditures
(Eddy, 1984; Howard & Reddy, 2018). Risk-adverse physicians, under conditions of
uncertainty, tend to make more conservative medical decisions; they order more tests, refer more
often and hospitalize more frequently (Fiscella et al., 2000). Conversely risk-seeking physicians
have less consultations, less “rule-out” testing and therefore lower medical expenditures
(Eisenberg, 2002). This study hypothesizes that the differences in physicians’ risk-seeking
attitudes and their response to uncertainty may also explain the variation in medical upcoding
and downcoding behavior. If risk-adverse physicians behave conservatively under conditions of
uncertainty, we can also expect to see conservative coding behavior. Risk-seeking physicians
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who are less security-minded, can be expected to push the envelope and upcode more frequently
than their risk-adverse counterparts.
Arguably, medical coding – evaluation and management coding in particular – is more of
an art than a science (King et al., 2002). Whether they possess the necessary knowledge,
physicians face ambiguous coding decisions every day that are made under conditions of
uncertainty and risk. If their coding decisions are incorrect, physicians face lost revenue to their
practice or government audits and possible penalties for fraud. Recognizing that certain codes
carry higher levels of reimbursement, psychological factors, such as risk-seeking attitudes, may
enter into the physician’s decision-making process (Agrawal et al., 2013). Physicians who are
risk-adverse and not certain of the correct codes may be more inclined to downcode or underrepresent their services by billing a lower reimbursing code. Alternatively, risk-seekers
(physicians with a higher tolerance for risk and ambiguity) may bill higher reimbursing codes
more frequently.
Physician payment incentives have been shown to influence physician behavior (Lagarde
& Blaauw, 2017). Investigators have shown the current system of reimbursement gives
physicians financial incentives to up-code (Adams et al., 2002; Brunt, 2011; Lorence &
Richards, 2002). As highlighted in Figure 1.1, payment can increase by 26% to 64% for each
incremental level of coding for an established patient visit. The greater the physician’s
propensity for risk-taking, the more susceptible he/she may be to pressures to up-code. For
example, despite having the requisite knowledge of proper coding techniques, physicians may
choose to upcode to maximize their profits regardless of the associated risks (Agrawal et al.,
2013; Brunt, 2011). The inverse would also be true. Physicians who are risk-adverse may be
more conservative in their billing practices and have low billing accuracy because of their
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tendency to downcode. Stated differently, physicians with high risk-seeking attitudes may have
higher incidents of upcoding. Conversely, risk-adverse physicians may have higher incidents of
downcoding. The hypothesis based on this prior research is shown as follows:
H2a: There is a positive relationship between risk-seeking physicians and upcoding.
H2b: There is a negative relationship between risk-adverse physicians and downcoding.
Control Variables
We completed our model with five control variables, which we expected to be correlated
with upcoding and downcoding errors. Conflicting evidence exists about the effect of years of
experience on coding behavior (Chao et al., 1998; Zuber et al., 2000). For example, Howard et
al. (2018) showed that faculty members had a statistically significant higher level of upcoding
than third year medical students, who were generally more conservative in their coding behavior.
Consequently, our model controlled for years of work experience. Other factors, such as the type
of medical license and type of practice, may also affect coding behavior.
Second, we were interested in investigating whether different practice types were more
susceptible to coding errors. For example, the Family and Internal Medicine practice type is a
heavier utilizer of E/M codes than other practice types. It is plausible that this heavier utilization
may translate into higher coding errors. Third, while gender and type of medical license (Doctors
versus Physician Assistants and Advanced Nurse Practitioners) have not been shown to have a
measurable effect on coding behavior, we included those characteristics in our model as
additional potential explanatory variables. Finally, since each physician did not have an equal
number of audits during the sample period, we also controlled for the number of audited records.
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Tables
Table 2.1. Literature Review Summary of Key Contributory Factors to Billing Accuracy. *
Contributory
Factor

Training &
Knowledge

Authors

Findings

Publication

Cohen et
al., 2001

Knowledge gaps: Authors argue clinicians are not prepared to enter practice
as education programs do not focus on billing and coding concepts.
Empirical results: survey of basic coding and billing questions resulted in a
2.27 mean knowledge score on a 10-point scale. 74% of nurses reported not
being confident with their billing and coding skills despite acknowledging
that incorrect coding could adversely impact revenue.

Nursing
Economics

Ng et al.,
2001

Training gaps: A review of 344 outpatient clinic visit notes documented by
residents showed a 38% accuracy rate. Authors attribute errors to residency
training and conclude "when pediatric residents are not trained adequately in
proper coding practices, the potential for billing discrepancies is high and
potential reimbursement differences may be substantial"

Pediatrics

Adams et
al., 2002

Knowledge gaps: Authors take the position that physicians may not be
getting paid what they deserve due to inadequate medical record
documentation and coding.

Adiga et
al., 2006

Training gaps: 42% of residents reported receiving “0” hours a month of
billing and coding training. Study concluded that residents feel they have a
low level of knowledge regarding outpatient Medicare billing, which was
supported by their lower test scores than practicing Internists. The residents
strongly agreed (on a 5-point Likert scale) that they do not receive enough
education about Medicare reimbursement and believe it should be a
requirement during residency.

Journal of
National
Medical
Association
Journal of
General
Internal
Medicine

Jones et
al., 2008

Training gaps: Authors argue residents complete their training with minimal
or no knowledge on coding of charges. Empirical results: educational
intervention demonstrated an increase of 36% to 88% in coding accuracy
among residents after a series of 10 monthly lectures.

American
Journal of
Surgery

Andreae et
al., 2009

Training gaps: Surveyed 3,300 physicians rating the adequacy of their
coding and billing training. Qualitative results: 81% of generalists and 78%
of specialists indicated they could use more training in billing and coding.
Fewer than 20% reported their training was adequate.

Clinical
Pediatrics

Holt et al.,
2010

Knowledge gaps: A review of 351 randomly selected office visit notes from
two residency programs, downcoding occurred in 33% of the cases. Study
also did not find any differences in coding accuracy among experienced
faculty or resident trainees Author attributes error rates to lack for formal
coding training.

Southern
Medical
Association

Agrawal et
al., 2013

Training gaps: Opinion piece - Posits despite the enormous financial and
legal consequences at stake, documentation and billing are not performed
well by many physicians and physician offices. Argues physicians receive
little education in how to manage and steward finite resources, making
formal education of physicians in program integrity an essential component
of medical professionalism.

Journal of
American
Management
Association
(JAMA)

Varcallo et
al., 2017

Training gaps: Conducted a training intervention at two separate sites of 32
residents. Coding accuracy pre-intervention was 53.8% and 85.4% post
intervention. The P-value was 0.20. This was not a longitudinal study;
therefore, conclusions cannot be made regarding the long-term retention of
this knowledge.

Journal of
Surgical
Education

Howard et
al., 2018

Knowledge gaps: Retrospective chart review of medical students’ and
faculty documentation showed medical students failed to document
sufficient detail to select the appropriate medical code. Empirical results:
median faculty level of service was four (4) and median student level of
service was three (3). Study concluded that medical students were poorly
prepared in the area of accurate documentation and coding.

Journal of
Surgical
Education
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Table 2.1 (Continued)
Contributory
Factor

Fee-ForService
Payment
System

Authors

Findings

Publication

Brennan et
al., 2011

Despite the financial cost associated with incorrect billing, physicians do not
put forth the effort to bill correctly because the system is too complex.

Lorence et
al., 2002

Study determined that despite the risk of penalty or prosecution, there still
exists widespread motivation to optimize reimbursement through billing and
code selection practices.
When deciding about coding and billing, physicians are primarily motivated
by the economic incentive.

Current
Orthopedic
Practice
Journal of
Management
in Medicine
Journal of
National
Medical
Association
Health
Economics
Journal of
Family
Practice

Adams et
al., 2002

Brunt,
2011
Chao et.
al, 1998

Zuber et.
al, 2000

Coding
System
Complexity

Kikano et
al., 2000

King et al.,
2002

Brennan et
al., 2011

Empirical study found evidence of profit maximizing behavior. The greater
the marginal revenue, the higher the probability of the physician upcoding.
In this study of family practice physicians, concordance rates were shown to
be very low between physicians and trained coding experts. The study
suggests the coding system is too complex and subjective to hold physicians
accountable to penalties for coding accuracy. Study also found under-coding
and over-coding occurred at the same rate for attending physicians as well as
residents. Experienced played no significant role in coding accuracy
Study examined whether medical physicians and trained coding auditors
agree in their assignment of office codes using 1995 and 1998 guidelines.
Auditors agreed with medical physicians in 15.2% of the cases (1995) and
29.2% (1998) of the cases. Concordance among auditors was low at 31%
(1995) and 44.3% (1998). Found no statistical difference in coding accuracy
based on years of experience.
Using the Kappa statistic, this study identified low interrater reliability
between trained nurse coders (36%). Frequency between downcoding (21%)
and upcoding (19%) was similar. Upcoding was more common for new
patient visits.
Study aimed to determine the level of agreement of certified coding
specialists in their application of CPT E/M coding guidelines. Coding
specialists agreed on code assignment in 57% of cases. Downcoding
occurred more frequently for established patients. Upcoding occurred more
frequently with new patients.
Asserts physicians do not put forth the effort to code correctly because the
system is too complex.

* Organized by publication year.
Figures

Figure 2.1. Literature Review Process.
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Journal of
Family
Practice

Archives of
Family
Medicine
Archives of
Internal
Medicine

Current
Orthopedic
Practice

Self-Efficacy
Knowledge

H1a (-)

Downcoding

H1b (-)
Train-Perc

H1c (-)

Upcoding

H2a (-)
Skills

H2b (+)

Risk Seekers

Figure 2.2 Research Model.
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Control Variables:
• Work Experience (in years)
• Practice Type
• Doctor
• Male
• Number of Records Audited

CHAPTER THREE:
METHODOLOGY

Research Design
This study examines physician characteristics that could contribute to physician billing
accuracy. Specifically, this study explores the characteristics of physician risk-taking attitudes
and perceived self-efficacy on downcoding and upcoding behavior leveraging concepts found in
the literature. Merely investigating billing accuracy without considering upcoding or
downcoding could be misleading and inconclusive. Therefore, we separate the components of
billing accuracy into two separate dependent variables: upcoding and downcoding. Downcoded
and upcoded charts were obtained using archival data from internal databases of the subject
organization. Risk-attitude and self-efficacy constructs were measured using Likert scales in an
electronically administered survey. Following previous literature, constructs for knowledge,
perception of skills, and perception of training adequacy were used as a proxy for the selfefficacy construct. Risk-attitude scales were adapted from the scholarly research of Pearson
(1995) and Gerrity (1992).
Setting and Sample
This study leverages real-world, proprietary data from a large multi-specialty physician
group. The primary researcher of the study, an employed executive at the multi-specialty group,
secured company approval to utilize internal databases and proprietary information to conduct
the research study. The multi-specialty group employs 400 medical physicians who practice in
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more than 50 different specialties and sub-specialties in Florida. Each physician in the multispecialty group performs his/her own office-based evaluation and management coding. 2 The
target population for this study was restricted to the physicians licensed to bill evaluation and
management services to Medicare since this study is solely concerned with evaluation and
management coding errors, which represent more than 21% of outpatient coding errors
(Department of Health and Human Services, 2014). Since the survey was distributed only to
physicians who had evaluation and management within the scope of their practice, 325 of the
400 physicians on staff received the survey. To encourage participation, the subject pool
received an emailed cover letter from the researcher, explaining the purpose of the study and the
required consent. Additionally, the researcher promised to provide the participants with a copy of
the study results and assured them that only aggregate data results would be distributed and
published. Approval was secured from University of South Florida’s Institutional Review Board
(IRB).
Survey Instrument
Qualtrics (a robust, electronic survey instrument) was used to administer the survey to the
participant pool. The names and email addresses of each provider were uploaded into the
Qualtrics email distribution system. Each provider received an email with a link to the informed
consent, inviting them to participate in the survey. To reduce the length of the survey,
participants were not required to enter any demographic information (such as name or type of
practice) that could be obtained from internal company databases. To identify respondents, each
subject received a unique survey link, generated by Qualtrics, that associated the respondent’s
name to his/her survey response. Associating the survey response to each participant was

2

Hospital coding is performed by a centralized group of coders and is outside the scope of this study.
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necessary to correlate and analyze survey responses with billing accuracy rates and demographic
data (such as years of practice, gender, practice type, medical license type) stored within
company databases.
To encourage responses, reminder emails were sent at one-week, two-week and threeweek intervals following the initial invitation email. The survey was closed to further responses
after four weeks of data collection when the fourth reminder email produced no further response.
Responses from the survey were merged into an Excel file, incorporating each provider’s billing
accuracy rates and the control variables (years of practice, gender, practice type, and medical
license type).
Measures
Upcoding and Downcoding Errors
Coding errors are defined as a condition in which the code assigned by the physician
differs from the code assigned by a certified physician coding auditor (Zafirah et al., 2018).
Coding errors that arise from downcoding negatively impact the financial strength of the
organization while coding errors that occur from upcoding make the organization susceptible to
government audits, fines and penalties (Bauder, Khoshgoftaar, & Seliya, 2017).
For this study, billing accuracy was alternatively measured as the total number of
upcoding and the total number of downcoding errors. Total coding errors (upcoding and
downcoding) were used to measure a physician’s billing accuracy, a unidimensional dependent
variable in the study The downcoding and upcoding variables were measured as the total number
of upcoded or downcoded records during the 2016 to 2020 measurement period. Coding audits
within the physician group were performed by an American Association of Physician Coders
(hereafter AAPC) certified auditor with more than 30 years of coding, auditing, and physician
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education experience. AAPC is the largest accreditation body of physician coders in the United
States, lending credibility to the auditors’ credentials.
In 2016, the physician group’s internal compliance department began recording each
physician’s accuracy rate in an access database. Due to the organization’s resource constraints,
each physician did not receive an audit for each year within the measurement period (2016 –
2020). Fifty five percent (n=52) had audits in 2016; seventy percent (n=66) had audits in 2017;
ten percent (n=9) had audits in 2018; eighteen percent (n=17) had audits in 2019; eighteen
percent (n=17) had audits in 2019; and fifty-seven percent (n=54) of the survey respondents had
audits recorded in 2020. Physician billing accuracy was measured through a review of 10
randomly selected encounters for each physician. The study leveraged the billing accuracy rates
as recorded within the database.
To select the audit sample, the coding auditor first generated a report of all coded
encounters. To reduce sample bias, the coded encounters were selected using the “RAND”
function in Microsoft Excel to assign each encounter a computer-generated random number.
Then, the encounters were sorted by the random number assigned, and 10 encounters were
selected for review. If the physician selected billing code differed from the coding auditor’s
billing code, the record was dispositioned as an upcoding or downcoding error. The coding
auditor reviewed and discussed each error with the physician. This discussion was intended to
educate the physician and to achieve consensus on type of error and the billing accuracy rates.
After the discussion, if the physician successfully supported his/her chosen billing codes, the
accuracy rates were amended. The final billing accuracy rates and the number of upcoding and
downcoding errors were documented in the Access database.
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Some physicians in the medical group may be audited more often than their physician
colleagues. If a physician fails the audit, he/she is re-audited within 30 days of receiving
remedial education. The physician has three opportunities to achieve a satisfactory billing
accuracy rate, which the physician group has established at 90%. If the physician is unable to
achieve the appropriate accuracy rate after three audit attempts, responsibility for coding his/her
charges is assigned to a certified coder, for whose services the physician is required to pay.
Using the internal access database, billing accuracy scores of respondents were matched to their
survey responses.
Physician Risk-Seeking Attitude
Physician risk-seeking attitude is a construct used to measure physician’s propensity for
risk-taking (Pearson et al., 1995). It is a unidimensional variable adapted from the Gerrity (1992)
“reaction to uncertainty” measure and the Jackson Personality Index risk subscale (1975)
physician risk taking scales. Each scale is well known and has been extensively validated to
study physician behavior (Eddy, 1984; Nittingale, 1988; Holtgrave, 1991; Pearson, 1995;
Allison, 1998). The two scales are fully reproduced in Appendix Table A1.
The first scale, Jackson Personality Index, is a twenty-question scale used to study
physician clinical decisions and risk attitudes. Pearson et al. reduced the scale to six questions.
After administering the survey to an expert panel, we eliminated three additional questions due
to duplication and lack of relevance to the current study. The final three questions are shown in
Appendix Table A1.
The second risk scale used in the Pearson study was the Gerrity Physician Reaction to
Uncertainty scale, which has well documented psychometric properties and strong internal
reliability (Pearson et al., 1995). We made minor adaptations to replace references to medical
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situations with reference to E/M billing and coding. To measure face validity, the questions were
first administered to a panel of experts consisting of the Chief Medical Officer, the Chief
Compliance Officer, and a Family Practitioner on the Board of Directors.
Our final risk-taking survey consisted of eleven (11) questions, each measured on a
seven-point Likert scale (Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree). A physician who scored high on
the risk-taking scale is considered a risk-seeker. Conversely, a physician with a low score on the
risk-taking scale is considered risk adverse. Questions #2 and #7 (shown in Appendix Table A3)
were reverse coded so that 7= risk-seeking and 1 = risk aversion.
Physician Perceived Self-Efficacy
A physician’s perceived self-efficacy is impacted by his knowledge, his perception of his
skills and abilities, and his perception of how well he has been trained and prepared for accurate
medical coding (Cohen, Marculescu, & Sa, 2001; Nguyen et al., 2017). These three constructs,
further defined below, make up the physician’s perceived self-efficacy.
Physician Coding Knowledge (Self-Efficacy_Knowledge) The literature defines physician
coding knowledge as the level of physician awareness regarding clinical documentation
guidelines and coding principles (Varacallo et al., 2017). Following Varacallo’s (2017) lead,
physician coding knowledge was measured using five multiple-choice questions to test the
physician’s knowledge of E/M billing and coding principles. The knowledge questions were
developed by an AAPC-certified auditor, AAPC-certified physician coding educator, and AAPC
trainer. To test face validity and reliability, the knowledge questions were administered to a
panel of experts consisting of two AAPC-certified auditors and the Chief Medical Officer of the
subject organization. Modifications were made to the questions to correct ambiguity and improve
clarity. The five knowledge questions were finalized only after all three panelists agreed upon
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the wording and answers to the knowledge questions. The sum of all correct responses formed
the knowledge independent variable. As shown in Table 4.2, the knowledge scores ranged from
0 to 4 (out of 4) with a mean of 2.90.
Physician Perception of Training (Self-Efficacy_Training) Training perception was the
second component of self-efficacy. The literature discusses the inadequacy of physician coding
training and draws conclusions that this training gap leads to low levels of billing accuracy
(Adiga et al., 2006; Jones, 2008). These conclusions suggest the physician’s perception of the
adequacy of his/her training could potentially impact his upcoding and downcoding behavior.
Nguyen et al. (2017) explored this concept by measuring the degree to which physicians have
been exposed to formal training on billing, coding, and documentation concepts as well as their
perception of the adequacy of that training. Borrowing from this research, perception of training
was measured using a one-question self-assessment (reproduced in Appendix Table A2), where 1
= no training, 2 = inadequate training, and 3 = adequate training. We grouped the responses so
that 0 = no training and inadequate training and 1 = adequate training.
Physician Perception of Coding Skills (Self-Efficacy_Skills) Skills was the third
component of self-efficacy. In their research on physician billing accuracy, Nguyen et al. (2017),
related physicians’ perception of their coding skills to their overall confidence with coding and
billing. Borrowing the survey questions from their research, this study also assessed the
perception of physician’s skills on a five-point Likert scale, where 1 was excellent and 5 was
terrible. The scale was reverse coded such that a score of 1 was terrible and 5 was excellent.
Taken together, these three areas measured physicians’ perceived self-efficacy.
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Other Physician Characteristics
Other physician characteristics, such as gender, years of experience, practice type, and
type of medical license, were collected from internal company databases and used as additional
explanatory (control) variables. Table 3.1 provides a summary of the details of the data
collection methodology, the description of each variable, and their association with each survey
question.
Tables
Table 3.1. Variable Definition, Operationalization and Data Capture Methodology.
Variable
Billing Accuracy
(Accuracy)

Downcoding

Upcoding
Perceived SelfEfficacy
(Efficacy)
Physician Coding
Knowledge
(Self-EfficacyKnowledge)
Physician
Perception of
Skills
(Self-Efficacy Skills)

Operationalization

Methods

Measured by the percentage of accurate records
as determined from the coding audits conducted
by the AAPC-certified auditor.
Measured by the number of times the AAPCcertified auditor changed the physicians’ code
selection to a lower-value code.
Measured by the number of times the AAPCcertified auditor changed the physicians’ code
selection to a higher-value code.
The variable for perceived self-efficacy of the
physician was created by combining Knowledge,
Skills and Train-Perc variables.
Indicates how knowledgeable physicians are with
evaluation and management coding guidelines.

Indicates how confident a physician is with their
coding skills.

Physician
Perception of
Training
(Self-Efficacy Train_Perc)

Indicates how comfortable a physician is with the
coding training he received.

Physician RiskSeeking Attitude
(RiskSeekers)

Indicates whether the physician is risk-adverse
and therefore conservative in their coding
behavior, or risk-seeking and therefore
aggressive in their coding behavior.

Male

Indicates the gender of the respondent (male = 1,
female = 0)
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Utilizing an internal coding audit database,
responses to the survey questions were
matched to physician billing accuracy
scores.
Utilizing an internal coding audit database,
the frequency of downcoded codes were
recorded.
Utilizing an internal coding audit database,
the frequency of downcoded codes were
recorded.
See Knowledge, Skills and Train_Perc for
data-capture methodology
Part of the self-efficacy variable, physician
coding knowledge was measured using a
brief questionnaire to test the physician’s
knowledge on billing and coding principles.
Part of the self-efficacy variable, the
physicians answered one question denoting
confidence in their coding skills (1= no
training, 2=adequate training and
3=inadequate training).
Part of the self-efficacy variable, the
physicians answered one question denoting
confidence in their coding training (1=
excellent 2=good 3= average, 4=fair and
5=terrible). The scale was reverse coded
prior to regression analyses where 5 became
excellent.
The risk attitude measures were adapted
from two scales measuring attitudes related
to risk taking. A six-question risk-taking
scale adapted from the Jackson Personality
Index and used to study physician clinical
decisions and risk attitudes. The second is
an adaptation of the Gerrity 12-question
Physician Reaction to Uncertainty (PRU)
scale. See minor adaptations in Appendix
Table A3.
Referenced from internal company
databases.

Survey
Question
N/A

N/A

N/A

Q.#18Q.#23

Q.#20Q.#23

Q.#19

Q#18

Q.#1 –
Q.#11

N/A

Table 3.1 (Continued)
Variable

Doctor

Work Experience

Operationalization

Methods

The type of medical license the physician
received. (Medical Doctor and Doctor of
Osteopathy = 1, Advanced Practitioner
Registered Nurse and Physician Assistant = 0)
Indicates the years of medical practice
experience of the physician as determined by
the year in which he/she received their medical
license.

Referenced from internal company
databases.

N/A

Referenced from internal company
databases.

N/A

# of Records
Audited

Denotes the total number of medical charts the
AAPC-auditor reviewed and used as
documentation to audit the medical code billed.

Referenced from internal company
databases.

Practice Type

Indicates the physician’s medical specialty.
Practice Types with less than 4 observations
were grouped together as “Other”

Referenced from internal company
databases.
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Survey
Question

N/A

CHAPTER FOUR:
RESULTS

Of the 325 electronic surveys distributed, 96 subjects completed the survey. One
participant was removed from the study for not meeting the required criteria for the sample
frame, which was physicians who bill Medicare evaluation and management services. Another
participant – who happened to be an extreme outlier (6 standard deviations from the mean) – was
also removed from the study. His audited cases were not evaluation and management services, so
they did not meet the sample criteria. Table 4.1 presents the participants’ demographic
characteristics. Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics for each dependent and independent
variable used in the study. We report the correlation matrix of the univariate relationships in
Table 4.10 and multivariate regression results in Table 4.3.
Sample Characteristics
Of the 94 participants, the sample consisted of 52 females (55.3%) and 42 males (44.7%)
with most respondents (63.8%) trained as a Doctor. Of the 19 practice types represented in the
survey, nearly half of the respondents were in the Family/Internal Medicine practice type
(48.9%). Of note, Family/Internal Medicine represents 35% of the physicians within the
physician group. Of the remaining respondents, other practice types included Cardiology (8.5%),
Dermatology (5.3%), and Orthopedics (5.3%). The other 14 practice types had fewer than five
respondents each and were categorized as “Other.” Of the 94 respondents, 31% were novices
with less than five years of work experience while 23% had more than 20 years of experience.
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Upcoding and Downcoding Billing Errors
The mean billing accuracy was 83.8%, with a standard deviation of 0.129. The
participants’ billing accuracy ranged from 30% to 100% (See Table 4.2). Upcoding was more
prevalent than downcoding across each practice type, with physicians with one to five years of
experience having the lowest accuracy rates (78.8%). Doctors had the highest accuracy rates
compared to other types of medical practitioners (85.2% and 79.9% respectively). The
orthopedic practice type had the lowest accuracy rates (66.4%) with the highest incidence of
upcoding. Orthopedic coding, particularly evaluation and management of trauma care patients, is
well known for its complexity and nuances (Brennan & Probe, 2011). This known complexity
could potentially explain the low accuracy rates. Conversely, the Dermatology practice type had
the highest accuracy rates (92.1%), which may be attributed to their use of a cloud-based
Dermatology-focused coding software. No other practice type within the physician group uses a
software that suggests billing codes based on the provider’s documentation. The correlation
matrix (Table 4.10) shows support for the hypothesis that knowledge is negatively correlated
with downcoding. Physician characteristics, such as Males and Doctors, were not significantly
associated with upcoding or downcoding behavior. Physicians with more work experience
tended to downcode less.
Physician Self-Efficacy
The study supported two of the three hypotheses about physician self-efficacy:
H1a: There is a negative relationship between the physician’s coding knowledge and
downcoding – supported.
H1b: There is a negative relationship between the physician’s perception of the adequacy
of training and downcoding – not supported.
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H1c: There is a negative relationship between physicians’ perception of their coding
skills and downcoding - supported.
In the multivariate regression analysis, we found support for hypothesis H1a, which
argues that physicians who lack the requisite coding knowledge will have more downcoding
errors (p=0.004). We also found support for hypothesis H1c, which asserts physicians who lack
confidence in their coding skills would have more conservative downcoding behavior (p=0.026).
We did not find support for hypothesis H1b, which proposes physicians who believed they were
very well trained and prepared for medical coding would have less downcoding errors. Contrary
to our hypothesis, we found a positive relationship between training perception and downcoding
(p=0.023). Column 2 of Table 4.3 shows the results of the Ordinary Least Squares regression
model.
As an additional robustness check, we performed a sensitivity analysis using the Poisson
regression model, which is considered a more robust regression model than ordinary least
squares regression for count variables such as upcoding and downcoding. Therefore, the models
were re-estimated using the Poisson method. Similar to the Ordinary Least Squares regression
model, the Poisson results fully supported Hypothesis H1a and H1c but not H1b, which added
credibility to our findings.
Physician Risk-Seeking Attitude
Our results supported one hypothesis about physician risk-seeking attitude:
H2a: There is a negative relationship between risk-seekers and downcoding – not
supported
H2b: There is a positive relationship between risk-seekers and upcoding - supported
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Eleven survey questions - modified from Pearson’s Physician Risk Scale and Gerrity’s
Physician risk tolerance scale - were designed to measure the participants’ risk-seeking attitude.
The responses to each question are shown in Appendix A3. As shown in Table 4.2, the mean
score on the risk-seeking questions was 52.13, with a standard deviation of 10.91. The minimum
score was 19, and the maximum score as 77. The Cronbach’s alpha of risk-attitude was 0.853,
suggesting strong construct reliability.
We found support for Hypothesis H2b, which posits that risk-seekers would have more
upcoding (P=0.022). As physicians become less risk-adverse, they are more likely to overcode.
Column 1 of Table 4.3 shows the regression results. We did not find support for hypothesis H2a,
which predicted that risk seekers would have less incidences of downcoding. The coefficient was
negative but not significant, which could be attributed to the study’s sample size. Table 4.4
presents a summary of the hypotheses and the results.
Additional Analyses
Thus far, we have focused on the effects of physician personality characteristics on
upcoding and downcoding behavior. We also wanted to determine if these same characteristics
would predict overall billing accuracy. One could argue that upcoding and downcoding are of
equal concern. Though the U.S. government is concerned with upcoding as a cost to a financially
vulnerable healthcare system, physician practices are concerned with both upcoding and
downcoding. Upcoding exposes the practice to potentially significant fines and penalties while
downcoding costs the practice in lost revenue. Billing accuracy as a measure of coding accuracy
does not distinguish between the type of coding errors: upcoding versus downcoding errors.
However, it serves as an important indicator to practitioners of the overall coding accuracy of
their organization.
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Therefore, we extended our analysis to include billing accuracy as a dependent variable
in our model. We wanted to evaluate whether billing accuracy, the percent of records coded
correctly, was affected by the physician’s risk-seeking behavior, knowledge, training, and skills.
Our findings are presented in column 1 of Table 4.5. The results indicate the physicians’ training
perception and risk-seeking behavior have the most significant effect on billing accuracy. As
physicians become less risk-adverse, their billing accuracy decreases because of the increase in
upcoding. Similarly, as they become more confident in their training, we see a decrease in billing
accuracy with an emphasis on upcoding errors. We conducted a sensitivity analysis by repeating
the analysis using the Fractional Response Model which is considered a more robust method of
regression analysis for fractional dependent variables such as billing accuracy. The results which
are shown in column 2 of Table 4.5 are consistent with and fully support our previous findings
giving confidence to our conclusions.
Second, we examined the effect of physician income on upcoding behavior. The methods
of physician compensation and their vulnerability to abuse and manipulation is a central concern.
Accordingly, we performed additional analyses to determine if physician income increased
upcoding. As we did not have access to the salaries of physicians, we utilized the annual revenue
as a proxy for income. We acknowledge that physician revenue as a proxy for income may have
influenced our results. However, we believe it is a strong proxy because physician compensation
is directly tied to their overall revenue. As revenue increases, so does income.
We measured income in two ways and investigated the effect of both income measures
on coding behavior. First, we calculated the natural log of each physician’s average revenue for
each of the five years of the study; then, we calculated the natural log of each physician’s total
revenue. Physician revenue was not statistically significant for upcoding (See Table 4.8).
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This finding may suggest that the motivation to upcode may not be as simplistic as
personal self-interested motivations of greed and profit maximization. Contrary to these
propositions, researchers such as Kumetz offers an alternative explanation. While Kumetz agrees
that the fee for service reimbursement system contributes to the upcoding problem, he argues
that it is not because of greed but rather because the system is inadequate in fairly compensating
physicians. He points out that physicians who perceive their level of care to be highly complex,
will gravitate towards higher reimbursing codes. Given this assertion, income and compensation
would not have any effect on upcoding behavior, as suggested by results of this study.
Third, we investigated whether the organization was experiencing systematic upcoding. If
the degree of overcoding was the same from each year to the next, the organization may have a
problem with serial upcoding. We performed a pairwise correlation analysis using the average
upcoding and downcoding data for each of the five years included in the study. We did not find
any systematic correlation from one year to the next. Therefore, upcoding in one given year does
not suggest there will be the same rate of upcoding in the next year. As Table 4.7 shows, there
was no high degree of correlation across each year; consequently, it appears the organization
does not have a systematic problem with upcoding. Since this analysis did not investigate each
individual physician’s coding behavior across each year of the study, we do not know whether
any of the individual physicians in the study may be serial upcoders. Our correlation analysis is
applicable only at the organization level. We also acknowledge that our results may be affected
by our small sample size.
Fourth, we conducted two sets of robustness checks. The first to determine if our
methodology suffered from reverse causality. The second to test the sensitivity of our model to
different risk-seeking constructs.
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Reverse causality was a concern because the survey was administered in 2020; however,
many of the coding audits were completed in prior years. The respondent’s responses to the
survey questions may have been influenced by the previous survey results. To help mitigate
these concerns, we re-ran the analysis using the most two recent audit years: 2019 and 2020. The
results are shown in Table 4.6 and provide validation to our original findings.
The results using the last two years of audit data (2019 and 2020) were the same as the
last five years of audit data (2016 to 2020). Again, we found support for hypothesis H1a, H1c,
and H2b and did not find support for hypothesis H1c and H2a. Using the 2019 and 2020 audit
scores, we again noted that as physician self-efficacy (their coding knowledge and overall
confidence in their training and coding skills) increases, their tendency to overcode also
increases. Likewise, we again found that as risk-seeking characteristics increase (and risk
aversion decreases), so does upcoding behavior. Risk-seeking attitudes again had no significant
effect on undercoding. These results provide reasonable assurance that reverse causality may not
be in the research design.
Our second robustness check investigated the sensitivity of our results to different
calculations of the risk-seeking variable. Investigators of physician risk-seeking behavior
categorized physicians into two groups based on their responses to the risk-taking scales and the
standard deviation data (Pearson et al., 1995; McKibbon et al., 2007). Our analysis used the
previously cited studies methodology to form the risk-seeking and risk-aversion groups.
Physicians were classified as risk-avoiders if their scores were lower than one standard deviation
from the mean and risk-seekers if their scores were greater than the one standard deviation from
the mean. Of the 94 physicians, 14 were classified in the risk-avoiders group and 12 were
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classified as risk-seekers. Physicians in the risk neutral group (68 physicians) were excluded
from the analysis as we were only concerned with the behavior of the extreme groups.
We find support for our previous findings on the effect of physician risk-seeking
attributes on coding behavior. In multivariate analyses, the risk-taking scores, whether analyzed
as a raw score or in risk-seeking and risk-aversion groups, remained significantly correlated with
billing accuracy (Table 4.9). Physicians in the risk-avoiders group had rates of upcoding that
were statistically significantly lower than the physicians in the risk-seekers group.
Other Ancillary Findings
The study produced several unexpected yet interesting findings that are worth of
additional investigation. First. the Dermatology practice type had statistically significant higher
rates of downcoding than other practice types while at the same time having statistically
significant lower rates of upcoding. As previously mentioned, Dermatology is the only practice
that leverages coding software to assist with their code selections. The software may potentially
explain their lower rates of upcoding. To explain the downcoding we interviewed the various
Dermatologists who participated in the study. Each Dermatologist, during separate interviews,
explained that their coding behavior is influenced by the Dermatologist Professional Association.
This Professional Association, as a matter of philosophy, encourages its members to bill the
lower reimbursing codes despite a higher code being warranted. This type of professional
practice conservatism is a possible explanation for this unexpected finding.
Conversely, we saw Orthopedic physicians demonstrate statistically significant higher
levels of upcoding than the other practice types. Interviews with the department administrators
provide some insight into the potential explanations for this behavior. Orthopedic procedures are
typically complex and not well represented by the current code set. To accommodate for this
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perceived deficiency, Orthopedic physicians tend to over-utilize the higher reimbursing code
sets. They believe that because of their work is entitled to greater reimbursement. While the
over-utilization of the higher codes was apparent in the study, we cannot unequivocally attribute
this finding to entitlement. Future research studies should further investigate this phenomenon
and its pervasiveness among other practice types.
Tables
Table 4.1. Survey Respondents Demographic Characteristics (N=94). *
----------------------Means ---------------------Accuracy
Upcoding
Downcoding
78.8%
1.59
0.86
84.9%
3.67
0.28
84.9%
4.07
0.60
86.1%
2.90
0.86
87.5%
3.36
0.88

Work Experience (in years)
1-5
6-10
11-15
16-20
>20

N
29
18
15
10
22

%
30.9%
19.1%
16.0%
10.6%
23.4%

Male
Female

42
52

44.7%
55.3%

84.5%
83.2%

3.6
2.4

0.53
0.65

Medical Doctor/Doctor of Osteopathy
Advanced Practitioner
Registered Nurse (APRN)/Physician Assistant (PA)
Practice Type*
Internal/Family Medicine
Cardiology
Dermatology
Orthopedic
*Other

60

63.8%

85.2%

3.3

0.48

34

36.2%

79.9%

2.4

0.62

48
8
5
5
35

48.9%
8.5%
5.3%
5.3%
33.0%

84.9%
89.2%
92.1%
66.4%
81.2%

2.6
3.0
0.8
5.4
3.0

0.59
0.25
1.2
0.2
1

Male

Doctor

* Nineteen practice types were represented in the survey. Dummy variables were created for a
practice type that had over 5 physician respondents. For example (Family Practice,
Dermatology, Cardiology, and Orthopedics). Practice types with fewer than 4 respondents are
grouped together and represented by “Other” category.
Table 4.2. Descriptive Statistics (n=94).
Variables
Billing Accuracy
Upcoding
Downcoding
Knowledge
Training Perception
Skills
Risk Seekers
Work Experience

Cronbach’s
Alpha
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.853
N/A

Mean

Median

SD

25th

75th

Min

Max

0.838
2.94
0.53
2.90
0.36
3.44
52.13
13.05

0.862
2.00
0.00
3.00
0.00
3.00
53.00
10.50

0.129
2.88
1.22
0.94
0.483
0.633
10.91
10.09

0.80
1.00
0.00
2.00
0.00
3.00
45.75
4.00

0.93
4.25
0.25
4.00
1.00
4.00
58.00
20.00

0.30
0.00
0.00
0
0
2.00
19
1.00

1.00
15.00
6.00
4
1
5.00
77
42.00
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Table 4.3. Coefficients of Regression Model for Upcoding and Downcoding. *

Self-Efficacy-Knowledge (H1)

-----------OLS Regression---------(1)
(2)
Upcoding
Downcoding
-0.415(0.004)**
0.392 (0.119)
(H1a)

------------Poisson Regression-------(3)
(4)
Upcoding
Downcoding
0.151 (0.070)
-0.540 (0.014)**
(H1a)

1.274 (0.019)**

0.695 (0.023)**
(H1b)

0.322 (0.044)**

1.260 (0.015)**
(H1b)

0.187(0.637)

-0.504(0.026)**
(H1c)

0.088 (0.404)

-0.782 (0.064)*
(H1c)

0.053 (0.022)**
(H2b)

-0.002 (0.890)
(H2a)

0.014 (0.053)*
(H2b)

-0.005 (0.834)
(H2a)

Male

0.530 (0.302)

-0.212 (0.463)

0.054 (0.717)

-0.227 (0.583)

WorkExperience

-0.001 (0.962)

-0.024 (0.120)

-0.006 (0.443)

-0.053 (0.047)**

Doctor

-0.874 (0.130)

0.192 (0.552)

-0.133 (0.342)

0.601 (0.218)

Family Practice

-1.296 (0.013)**

0.114 (0.698)

-0.429 (0.008)**

0.298 (0.534)

Dermatology

-3.945 (0.000)***

1.237 (0.041)*

-1.748 (0.001)***

1.789 (0.003)**

Cardiology

-1.088 (0.216)

0.011 (0.982)

-0.454 (0.049)*

0.143 (0.854)

Orthopedics

2.366 (0.028)**

-0.630 (0.292)

0.744 (0.000)***

-1.252 (0.269)

0.181 (0.000)***

0.002 (0.885)

0.058 (0.000)***

0.000 (0.991)

R squared

58.3

26.2

N/A

N/A

Adjusted R squared

51.6

14.2

N/A

N/A

Wald Chi Square

N/A

N/A

112.024 (0.000)***

35.737 (0.001)**

8.613 (0.000)***

2.180 (0.018)*

N/A

N/A

94

94

94

94

Self-Efficacy-Train _Perc (H1)
Self-Efficacy-Skills (H1)
RiskSeekers (H2)

Records Audited

F Statistic
N

* p value in parentheses. * significance at 0.1; **significance at 0.05; ***significance at 0.001.
Nineteen practice types were represented in the survey. Dummy variables were created for a
practice type that had over54 physician respondents. For example (Family Practice,
Dermatology, Cardiology, and Orthopedics). Practice types with fewer than 4 respondents are
grouped together and represented by “Other” category.
Table 4.4. Summary of Hypotheses and Results.
Hypothesis
H1a
H1b
H1c
H2a
H2b

Description
There is a negative relationship between a physician’s knowledge
and downcoding.
There is a negative relationship between a physician’s perception of
their training and downcoding.
There is a negative relationship between a physician’s perception of
their skills and downcoding.
There is a negative relationship between risk seekers and
downcoding.
There is a positive relationship between risk seekers and upcoding.
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Result
Supported
Not Supported
Supported
Not Supported
Supported

Table 4.5. Coefficients of Regression Model for Billing Accuracy. *

Billing Accuracy

(2)
Fractional
Response
Billing Accuracy

0.001 (0.915)

0.0237 (0.795)

Training Perception

-0.126 (0.000)***

-0.835 (0.000)***

Risk-seeking

-0.003 (0.025)**

-0.022 (0.005)**

Skills

0.031 (0.172)

0.252 (0.158)

Male

0.036 (0.203)

0.264 (0.153)

Experience

0.002 (0.136)

0.015 (0.182)

Education

0.029 (0.076*)

0.186 (0.147)

(1)
OLS Regression
Variables
Knowledge

♦Family Practice
♦Dermatology

0.041 (0.151)

0.250 (0.170)

0.122 (0.043)**

1.120 (0.000)***

♦Cardiology

0.072 (0.141)

0.528 (0.284)

♦Orthopedics

-0.109 (0.070)*

-0.623 (0.054)*

0.001 (0.695)

0.003 (0.694)

R squared

34.6

37.4

Adjusted R squared

23.9

N/A

3.252 (0.001)***

1.741 (0.022)**

94

94

Records Audited

F Statistic
N

* p value in parentheses. * significance at 0.1; **significance at 0.05; ***significance at 0.001.
Nineteen practice types were represented in the survey. Dummy variables were created for a
practice type that had over 5 physician respondents. For example (Family Practice,
Dermatology, Cardiology, and Orthopedics). Practice types with fewer than 4 respondents are
grouped together and represented by “Other” category
Table 4.6. Coefficients of Regression Model for Upcoding and Downcoding in Years 2020 and
2019. *

Self-Efficacy_Knowledge (H1)

-----------OLS Regression---------(1)
(2)
Upcoding
Downcoding
-0.463 (0.004)**
0.588 (0.012)**
(H1a)

------------Poisson Regression-------(3)
(4)
Upcoding
Downcoding
0.361 (0.002)**
-0.486 (0.011)**
(H1a)

1.264 (0.043)**

0.861 (0.019)**
(H1b)

0.514 (0.023)**

1.174 (0.024)**

0.491 (0.205)

-.0514 (0.065)*
(H1c)

0.010 (0.956)

0.667 (0.125)

0.038 (0.042)**
(H2b)

0.007 (0.653)
(H2a)

0.025 (0.054)*
(H2b)

0.009 (0.621)
(H2a)

Male

0.497(0.309)

0.026 (0.940)

0.218 (0.374)

0.260 (0.518)

Experience

-0.036 (0.165)

-0.013 (0.481)

-0.020 (0.187)

-0.021 (0.419)

Doctor

0.325 (0.526)

-0.112 (0.760)

0.291 (0.270)

-0.025 (0.960)

Self-Efficacy_Train_Perc (H1)
Self-Efficacy_Skills (H1)
Risk-seeking (H2)

Family Practice

-0.763 (0.134)

0.014 (0.969)

-0.234 (0.367)

0.036 (0.941)

Dermatology

-2.730 (0.040)**

2.863 (0.003)**

-29.619 (no results)

2.173 (0.000)**
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Table 4.6 (Continued)
-----------OLS Regression---------(1)
(2)
Upcoding
Downcoding
-2.150 (0.029)**
0.410 (0.552)

Cardiology
Orthopedics
Records Audited
(in 2019 and 2020)
R squared

0.052 (0.953)

-0.810 (0.203)

0.158 (0.582)

-1.515 (0.097)*

0.279 (0.000)***

-0.004 (0.904)

0.075 (0.000)***

-0.030 (0.569)

67.0

38.0

N/A

N/A

59.1

23.1

N/A

N/A

Adjusted R squared
Wald Chi Square
F Statistic

------------Poisson Regression-------(3)
(4)
Upcoding
Downcoding
-29.619 (0.000)***
0.444 (0.526)

N/A

N/A

95.507 (0.000)***

32.022 (0.002)**

8.438 (0.000)***

2.547 (0.008)**

N/A

N/A

67

67

67

67

N

* p value in parentheses. * significance at 0.1; **significance at 0.05; ***significance at 0.001.
Nineteen practice types were represented in the survey. Dummy variables were created for a
practice type that had over 4 physician respondents. For example (Family Practice,
Dermatology, Cardiology, and Orthopedics). Practice types with fewer than 5 respondents are
grouped together and represented by “Other” category.
Table 4.7. Correlation of Upcoding Behavior Between 2019 and 2020. *
Total Upcoding

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

1
.487**
.874**
.733*
.391**
.651**

1
-.866
*
-.141
.129

1
*
.140
-.148

1
.833*
-.867

1
-.011

1

Total Upcoding
2020
2019
2018
2017
2016

* cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant. * significance at 0.05.
Table 4.8. Effect of Physician Compensation on Upcoding. *
Upcoding
Self-Efficacy_Knowledge

.422 (.106)

Self-Efficacy_Train_Perc

1.135 (.047)**

Self-Efficacy_Skills

.241 (.568)
0.051 (0.030)**
(H2a)
-0.111 (.536)

Risk-seeking
Compensation
Male

0.669 (0.222)

Experience

0.003 (0.914)

Doctor

-0.831 (0.170)
Family Practice

-1.220 (0.022)**

Dermatology

-33.753 (0.001)**

Cardiology

-1.067 (0.233)

Orthopedics

2.291 (0.039)
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Table 4.8 (Continued)
Upcoding
Records Audited

0.186 (0.000)***

R squared

58.4

Adjusted R squared

50.9

Wald Chi Square

N/A

F Statistic

7.726 (0.000)***

N

94

* p value in parentheses. * significance at 0.1; **significance at 0.05; ***significance at 0.001.
Nineteen practice types were represented in the survey. Dummy variables were created for a
practice type that had over 4 physician respondents. For example (Family Practice,
Dermatology, Cardiology, and Orthopedics). Practice types with fewer than 5 respondents are
grouped together and represented by “Other” category
Table 4.9. Upcoding for Physicians in Risk-Seeking and Risk-Avoidance Groups. *
Self-Efficacy_Knowledge

Upcoding
0.390 (.124)

Self-Efficacy_Train_Perc

1.150 (0.032)**

Self-Efficacy_Skills

0.237 (.565)

Risk-Seekers

0.331 (0.622)

Risk-Avoiders

-1.402 (0.047)**

Family Practice

-1.091 (0.037)**

Dermatology

-3.820 (0.001)**

Cardiology

-0.507 (0.574)

Orthopedics
Records Audited

2.819 (0.007)
0.164 (0.000)***

R squared

56.0

Adjusted R squared

50.1

F Statistic

9.501 (0.000)***

N

94

* p value in parentheses. * significance at 0.1; **significance at 0.05; ***significance at 0.001.
Nineteen practice types were represented in the survey. Dummy variables were created for a
practice type that had over 4 physician respondents. For example (Family Practice,
Dermatology, Cardiology, and Orthopedics). Practice types with fewer than 5 respondents are
grouped together and represented by “Other” category
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Table 4.10. Correlation Among Variables. *
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

1.Accuracy
2.Upcoding
3.Downcoding

.430*
*
.420*
*

.279*
*

.126

.157

-.147

1

4.Knowledge

5.RiskSeekers

1

.006

.303*
*
.062

-.214*

.208*

.236*

.025

.234*

.105

.110

-.159

.272*
*

.149

.592*
*

-.099

.201

1

6.Train_Perc

7.Skills

8.# Records
Audited
9.WorkExp

1
.417*
*
.337*
*
-.116

1
.480*
*

1

.144

.145

1

-.239*

.155

-.162

.161

-.161

.146

.094

.403*
*

.144

.146

-.053

-.039

-.059

.102

-.059

-.195

.050

.214*

-.112

.000

-.036

.126

.008

.203

.093

-.127

.045

.078

.081

-.047

-.053

.129

.007

-.071

.194

-.172

.026

.153

-.177

.131

.176

-.029

.321*
*

.204*

-.065

-.026

-.003

10.Doctor

11.Male
12.Family/Internal
Med

1
.323*
*
.355*
*

.369*
*

.069

-.024

-.016

.2

.039

-.097

-.167

.209*

.284*
*

.036

.188

.080

.120

-.018

-.146

-.214*

-.019

1

13.Cardiology

14.Dermatology

15.Orthopedic

1
.06
6
.04
4
.02
2
.16
8

1
.299*
*
-.232*

-.232*

1
.07
2
.07
2

* N=94, p value in parentheses. * significance at 0.1; **significance at 0.05; ***significance at
0.001.
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1
.05
6

1

CHAPTER FIVE:
DISCUSSION

Our goal in this study was to investigate physician personality characteristics that lead to
undercoding and overcoding behavior. Building on prior research and controlling for other welldocumented factors, we assessed the effect of physician risk-seeking attitudes and their
perceived self-efficacy (measured through an assessment of knowledge, skills, and training) on
coding behavior. We hypothesized that physicians who were risk-adverse, coupled with poor
training and low confidence in their coding skills, would downcode more frequently while
physicians who were less risk-adverse would more frequently upcode.
Our findings provide evidence in support of the literature and self-efficacy theory.
Physician knowledge and self-confidence in their coding skills had significant effects on
downcoding behavior. Physicians tend to undervalue their services and bill very conservatively
when they do not possess a strong grasp of the coding guidelines or have confidence in their
ability to correctly code. Studies conducted by Chao et al. (1998) and Lipsky (2001) showed
high rates of downcoding in new patient visit types perhaps because of their complexity. It is
well known that new patient visit coding criteria is more complex than established patient visits.
Our findings add support to this previous research. If physicians lack adequate knowledge to
code for more complex visit types, the response is often an undervaluation of services provided.
Conversely, we found that risk-seekers had lower billing accuracy. Our data suggest that
physicians’ attitudes toward risk may lead to significant variation in their coding behavior.
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Specifically, risk-seeking physicians tended to upcode more frequently than physicians who were
more risk adverse. The risk-seeking attitude measured their tolerance for the ambiguity of coding
and billing guidelines as well as their propensity to indulge in risky behavior. For this group of
risk-seekers, the risk of fraud detection and prosecution appears to be outweighed by the rewards
of financial gain from upcoding in this study. The notion that physicians are motivated by desire
for money continues to be an area of interest for health economists (Eisenberg, 2002). However,
this behavior is not universal to all physicians and, as our study showed, can be explained in part
by risk-seeking attitudes.
Our research contributes to a broad stream of literature on coding and billing accuracy.
Our review of prior literature highlights conflicting views on the determinants of billing
accuracy. Some scholars attribute low billing accuracy to inadequate education and training of
billing and coding concepts (Agrawal et al., 2013; Andreae et al., 2009; Howard & Reddy,
2018). Others argue the system is too complex to support consistency in billing accuracy
(Brennan & Probe, 2011; King et al., 2002). Yet still, other scholars point to physician attitudes,
apathetic attitudes from low self-efficacy that result in minimal effort to code and bill accurately
and risk-seeking attitudes that lead to a desire to profit from a flawed reimbursement system
(Brennan & Probe, 2011; Varacallo et al., 2017). Unlike this study, none of these prior studies
empirically tested these claims on real world coding behavior. Other studies inferred these
relationships based on surveys and deductions. Further, this study is the first of its kind to
investigate physician personality characteristics that may lead to upcoding and downcoding
behavior.
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Implications for Policy Makers
As healthcare costs continue to rise at unprecedented rates, improper payments resulting
from billing errors is a central healthcare policy concern. The Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) provides federally funded health insurance to more than 30% of the
U.S. population with annual expenditures that exceeded $1 trillion in fiscal year 2017
(Government Accountability Office, 2019). The Medicare and Medicaid insurance programs are
designated as high-risk programs. Their size and complexity makes them vulnerable to improper
payments, payments that should not have been made, or payments that were made in incorrect
amounts based on program requirements (Government Accountability Office, 2019). The CMS
has improperly paid out more than $77 billion in Medicare and Medicaid in fiscal year 2017, the
most recent improper payment information as of this study (Government Accountability Office,
2019).
This study supports findings from Brunt et al. (2011), who asserts that the existing feefor-service payment system incentivizes physicians to upcode. Our study suggests risk-seeking
physicians are more likely to upcode than risk-adverse physicians. When physicians lack
confidence and knowledge, we see more downcoding than upcoding. In summary, the fee-forservice reimbursement system that relies on the E/M coding guidelines does not appear to be
effective in doling out correct payments for physician services. Therefore, many stakeholders are
calling for a fundamental redesign of physician compensation (Landon, 2012). Short of a
complete replacement of the existing coding and reimbursement system, healthcare policy
makers are challenged with identifying and implementing strategies that will successfully reduce
upcoding while compensating physicians fairly for their services. Understanding the behaviors
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and attitudes that influence coding behavior remains a challenge for those interested in
influencing behavior.
This study supports advancing policies aimed at shifting payment models from fee for
service to quality of care and clinical outcomes. Our findings also suggest that any new policy, to
be effective, must neutralize the effect of physician personality on code selection and therefore
reimbursement outcomes. It is also clear that any health policy that aims at changing behavior
through education will have limited success with risk seekers. And fear inspired tactics will only
succeed in promoting unwarranted downcoding among physicians with low self-efficacy.
Implications for Practice
While this study did not aim to investigate differences in billing accuracy by medical
specialty (although worthy of future research), we found the Dermatology practice type to have
the highest billing accuracy rates, with the lowest incidences of upcoding. Even when controlled
for risk-seeking attitudes and self-efficacy variables, Dermatologists tend to have the highest
billing accuracy. This finding could be attributed to those physicians’ use of a coding-assisted
software. This software is integrated with the electronic medical record; based on the physician’s
documentation, it suggests the most applicable billing codes. To our knowledge, the
Dermatologists are the only physicians in the medical group using such a software.
This finding is evidence that investments in coding-assisted software may improve the
group’s accuracy and consequently, reduce exposure to government fines and penalties.
Considering the potential damages to a physician found guilty of violating the False Claim Act is
a civil penalty of not less than $5,500 plus three times the damages the government sustains, the
investment in coding assisted software seems insignificant and an astute compliance decision. As
seen in the Dermatology practice, the use of coding technology neutralized the negative effects
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of risk-seeking behaviors as well as knowledge and training gaps and consequently neutralized
the risk of violations of the False Claim Act.
Practice Managers can also remove coding decisions from physicians by investing in
centralized coding departments. Our review of the literature found one study whose conclusions
recommend a centralized coding approach. According to this study, “to optimize coding
accuracy, all physician-coded…cases warrant review by an experienced individual, preferably a
…certified coder, before final claims submission” (Duszak et al., 2004). Our study findings
suggest physicians will either undercode and cost the organization in missed revenue or overcode
and expose the organization to compliance risk. Removing physicians from the billing process
may be the best opportunity to improve overall accuracy.
Finally, absent computer-assisted software or centralized coding departments, compliance
departments must develop strategies to identify rogue physicians. The CMS publishes national
and state specific comparative billing reports that stratify billing code usage by practice type.
Compliance departments can compare their physicians’ billing code usage to these stratified
reports and focus their internal audit efforts on physicians who fall outside the stratified bands.
This approach is reactionary, retrospective, and does nothing to prevent undercoding or
overcoding. It should be used only as a supplement to centralized coding or coding-assisted
programs.
Coding accuracy is important for legal and financial reasons. The Department of Health
and Human Services continues to expand its fraud and abuse administrative budget to control
and reduce healthcare expenditures. Physicians may continue to upcode to offset the low
reimbursement they perceive as an undervaluation of their services (Kumetz & Goodson, 2013).
When the current fee-for-service payment system was introduced in 1992, Chao et al. (1998)
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found that physicians were routinely undervaluing their services (downcoding) and predicted a
rise in upcoding once they learned the new coding system. We may be seeing this prediction
materialize. Nonetheless, physicians found guilty of knowingly submitting false claims could
face significant financial penalties. Until the physician reimbursement system is realigned, the
problem of upcoding and high rates of improper payments will remain.
Limitations and Future Research
We acknowledge several limitations to our study and offer suggestions for future
research.
First, we acknowledge that this study would benefit from a larger sample size. We
witnessed many results approaching significance that could have crossed the threshold to
significance with a larger sample size. Also, our study was limited to one organization in a single
state. Cultural norms and organizational policies and practices may have influenced our results,
so variations in coding behaviors across geographic areas and different organizations were not
identified. Future research should study a cross-section of physicians across different
organizations and multiple states.
Second, our research did not control for variations in physicians’ coding practices, such
as the use of certified coders or the use of technology. Other research studies have shown
minimal difference in billing accuracy between physicians and certified coders (Zuber et al.,
2000); however, those studies did not examine the differences between undercoding and
overcoding. Benefits of technology to improve medical outcomes is well established, but
research on the benefits to improve coding accuracy is scant. The literature suggests that
computer-assisted coding software is not widely used in physician practices and may not be
capable of reducing coding errors (Cearnal, 2013; Shaffer, Mann, & Sachdeva, 2017). Further
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research should examine these claims, controlling for variations in coding practices, such as
physicians who use clerical staff for coding or computer-assisted coding software; future
research studies should further investigate the effect of these process variations on billing
accuracy, upcoding, and downcoding errors.
Finally, our study did not control for various compensation models or payer-mix.
Physicians who are reimbursed a fixed salary or who have capitation contracts may have
different incentives than those who receive bonuses based on volume. The audits in this study
were all conducted on Medicare patient encounters. That was by design because we were
interested in the effect of governmental scrutiny on coding behavior. Therefore, the study did not
account for variation in coding behavior based on other payer-types. It is possible that upcoding
behavior was more prevalent to compensate for the lower reimbursement rates from Medicare.
One may expect to see variations in coding behavior based on different types of compensation
models and payer-mix. A follow-up study could more closely examine the effect of different
types of physician compensation on undercoding and overcoding behavior.
Despite these limitations, this study adds to the current stream of research on this very
important topic in healthcare. Understanding the determinants of physician coding behavior is
paramount for those interested in influencing this behavior. This study provides compelling
evidence that further research in this area is well deserved.
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APPENDIX A: RISK ATTITUDE SCALES, SURVEY ITEMS AND SURVEY
RESPONSES

Table A1. Pearson’s (1995) Physician Risk-Attitude Scale. *

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Questions from Jackson’s Personality Index Risk-taking Subscale (1970)
Original Question
Modification
I try to avoid situations that have uncertain outcomes.
Question used in its original form
I enjoy taking risks
Omitted for brevity.
Taking risks does not bother me if the gains involved are high.
Question used in its original form.
I consider security an important element in every aspect of my
Omitted for brevity.
life.
People have told me that I seem to enjoy taking chances.
Omitted for brevity.
I rarely, if ever, take risks when there is another alternative
Question used in its original form.
Questions from Gerrity’s (1991) Physician Stress from Uncertainty Subscale
Original Question
Modification (bolded and italicized)
The uncertainty of patient care often troubles me.
Omitted. Duplicative of Q3.
Not being sure of what is best for a patient is one of the most
Not being sure of the correct E/M code is one of the most
stressful parts of being a physician.
stressful parts of being a physician
I am tolerant of the uncertainties present in patient care.
I am tolerant of the uncertainties present in E/M coding
I find the uncertainty involved in patient care disconcerting.
Omitted. Duplicative of Q3.
I usually feel anxious when I am not sure of a diagnosis.
I usually feel anxious when I am not sure of the correct
E/M code.
When I am uncertain of a diagnosis, I imagine all sorts of bad
When I am uncertain of an E/M code, I imagine all sorts of
scenarios – patient dies, patient sues etc.
bad scenarios – government audits, payment denial,
recoupments and fines etc.
I am frustrated when I do not know a patient’s diagnosis.
I am frustrated when I do not know the correct E/M code.
I fear being held accountable for the limits of my knowledge.
I fear being held accountable for the limits of my E/M
coding knowledge
Uncertainty in patient care makes me uneasy.
Omitted. Duplicative of Q5
I worry about malpractice when I do not know a patient’s
Omitted. Duplicative of Q6
diagnosis.
The vastness of the information physicians are expected to know
The vastness of the information physicians are expected to
overwhelms me.
know overwhelms me
I frequently wish I had gone into specialty or subspecialty that
I frequently wish I had more training and education that
would minimize the uncertainties of patient care
would minimize the uncertainties of E/M coding.
I am quite comfortable with the uncertainty in patient care
Question omitted. Duplicative of Q3 & Q9

* All questions were asked of a seven-point Likert scale from “strongly agree” to “strongly
disagree”. Adapted from the Jackson Personality Index and Gerrity Risk Scales.
Table A2. Nugyen’s Physician Perception of Training & Skills.
1.

2.

Select the most appropriate response:
a) I have not received any medical billing or coding training.
b) I have not received adequate medical billing and coding training
c) I have received adequate medical billing and coding training
How would you rate your overall coding skills?
a) Excellent (1)
b) Good (2)
c) Average (3)
d) Fair (4)
e) Terrible (5)
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Table A3. Questionnaire Items and Responses (N=94). *

Q#

1
2
3
4

5
6
7

8
9
10

11

Question

I try to avoid situations that have uncertain
outcomes.
Taking risks does not bother me if the gains
involved are high.
I rarely, if ever, take risks if there is another
alternative.
Not being sure of the correct E/M code is one
of the most stressful parts of being a physician.
I am tolerant of the uncertainties present in
E/M coding
I usually feel anxious when I am not sure of the
correct E/M code
When I am uncertain of an E/M code, I
imagine all sorts of bad scenarios – government
audits, payment denial, take-backs and fines
etc.
I am frustrated when I do not know the correct
E/M code
I fear being held accountable for the limits of
my E/M coding knowledge.
The vastness of the coding information
physicians are expected to know overwhelms
me.
I frequently wish I had more training
and education that would minimize the
uncertainties of E/M coding.

Q#

Question

12

I am motivated to code correctly because it
increases my reimbursement
E/M coding is an added stressor if I have to
look up the codes
Coding is not a priority because I have billing
staff to perform this task.
I find it difficult to code because of time
constraints.
Regardless of how I code, it does not affect my
income.
It is not my responsibility to code correctly.

13
14
15
16
17

Strongly
Disagree
(7)
N
%

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree
(5)
N
%

Somewhat
Agree
(3)
N
%

N

%

N

%

11

11.7%

31

31%

18

19.2%

16

17.%

5

5.3%

9

9.6%

4

4.1%

4

4.3%

10

10.6%

15

16%

13

13.8%

29

30.9%

13

13.8%

10

10.6%

6

6.4%

32

34%

22

23.4%

12

12.8%

11

11.7%

8

8.5%

3

3.2%

6

6.4%

19

20.2%

26

27.7%

18

19.2%

11

11.7%

8

8.5%

6

6.4%

4

4.26

16

17.0%

29

30.9%

10

10.6%

13

13.8%

13

13.8%

9

9.6%

8

8.5%

11

11.7%

31

33.0%

22

23.4%

8

8.5%

12

12.8%

2

2.1%

11

11.7%

15

16%

32

34%

15

16%

10

10.6%

7

7.5%

4

4.3%

17

18.1%

21

22.3%

33

35.1%

14

14.9%

2

2.1%

4

4.3%

3

3.2%

17

18.1%

24

25.5%

23

24.5%

15

16%

6

6.4%

6

6.4%

3

3.2%

22

23.4%

31

33%

24

25.5%

7

7.5%

5

5.3%

3

3.2%

2

2.1%

1

18.1%

34

36.2%

25

26.6%

8

8.5%

4

4.3%

2

2.1%

4

4.3%

(6)

Neither Agree
nor Disagree
(4)
N
%
Risk Scale

Agree
(2)

Strongly
Agree
(1)
N
%

Question #2 and #5 were reverse coded so that 7 = Risk-seeking and 1 = Risk Adverse
Positive Attitude to Coding
1

1.1%

1

1.1%

1

1.1%

10

10.6%

13

13.8%

42

44.7%

26

27.7%

3

3.2%

0

0%

3

3.2%

8

8.5%

10

10.6%

37

39.4%

33

35.1%

24

25.5%

29

30.9%

18

19.1%

7

7.4%

10

10.6%

5

5.3%

1

1.1%

5

5.3%

11

11.7%

12

12.8%

8

8.5%

26

27.7%

23

24.5%

9

9.6%

32

34%

36

38.3%

12

12.8%

4

4.3%

5

5.3%

5

5.3%

0

0%

39

41.5%

37

39.4%

5

5.3%

6

6.4%

5

5.3%

1

1.1%

1

1.1%
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Table A3 (Continued)

Q#

18
Q#
19

Question

Select the most appropriate response:
Question
How would you rate your overall E/M coding
skills?

Q#

Question

20

Select the E/M Code for this scenario:
Established patient arrives at your clinic for
their 10:00 am appointment. Patient with
stable COPD, stable HTN and DMII with a lab
result of Hgb A1C is 7.9. You see the patient,
order refills on medications for COPD and
HTN; Discuss diabetic diet, exercise and
increase their metformin to 1000 mg twice
daily. What level of service would you bill for
this patient?

Q#
21

Question
Select the E/M Code for this scenario: A
patient arrives at your office at 11:30 am
complaining of SOB, CP, diaphoresis and
anxiety. Your staff immediately takes the
patient to an exam room and adds supportive
care with supplemental oxygen. You enter the
room at 11:35 am; order a stat EKG and do a
cursory examination. As soon as you see the
abnormal EKG, you have your staff call 911
for transport to the closest Emergency
Room. Staff readies the paperwork to send
with the patient. The ambulance arrives at
1150 am, and care is transferred to the ACLS
ambulance personnel.

Strongly
Disagree
(7)
N
%

Disagree

Somewhat
Neither Agree
Somewhat
Agree
Strongly
Disagree
nor Disagree
Agree
Agree
(5)
(4)
(3)
(2)
(1)
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
Perceptions of Training
I have not received adequate medical coding
I have received adequate medical coding
training
training
57
60.6%
34
36.2%

(6)
N

%

I have not received any medical
coding training
3
3.2%

Excellent
4
4.3%

Good
37
39.4%

99203

3

3.2%

99291-25, 93000

9

9.7%

50

82.8%

3

3.2%

99215-25, 93000

99291, 93000

53

4

60%

75

Poor
3

4.3%

Terrible
3.2%

Knowledge Questions
99215

99214

77

Perceptions of Skills
Average
53.2%

99204

1

0%

None of the Above

1.08%

99215

10

0

9

9.7%

None of the Above

10.6%

17

18.4%

Table A3 (Continued)

Q#

22

Q#

Question

Your HPI should include what information to
give you comprehensive credit:
An established patient is under your care and
comes to your office for their 6-month followup for management of chronic
disease(s). They have no acute conditions to
report at this time. You dictate the HPI, ROS,
and PFSH.
*Responses are shown below
Question
True or False: The CY 2019 PFS final rule
expanded current policy for office/outpatient
E/M visits starting 1/1/2019 to provide that any
part of the Chief Complaint (CC) or history
that is recorded in the medical record by
ancillary staff or the beneficiary does not need
to be re-documented by the billing
practitioner. Instead, when the information is
already documented, the billing practitioner
can review the information, update or
supplement it as necessary, and indicate in the
medical record she has done so.

Strongly
Disagree
(7)
N
%
*A

7

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree
(5)
N
%
*B

(6)
N

%

7.6%

20

21.7%

Neither Agree
nor Disagree
(4)
N
%

Somewhat
Agree
(3)
N
%
*C

6

Agree
(2)
N

%
*D

6.5%

True

Strongly
Agree
(1)
N
%

59

64.13%

False

84

90.3%

9

9.7%

* Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding. N may not equal 94 because not all physicians answered each question.
A.
Patient has longstanding HTN, DMII, HLD and COPD
B.
HTN Stable on lisinopril, DMII stable on metformin, HLD stable on statin, and COPD
C.
HTN, DMII, HLD and COPD are all stable at this time on the medication regimes discussed at the visit on 11/7/2019.
D.
Both B and C are correct
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